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INTRODUCrION

The validity of the use of legislative history has been debated for a
number of years, but never has it received the high level of attention it
does today. While the use of legislative history has waxed and waned,
never has the institution of legislative history undergone such a direct
assault as is being witnessed today in the U.S. Supreme Court. Led by
Justice Scalia, judges and academics are questioning the value of this old
tool for interpreting statutes. Such criticism is crystallizing into a
coherent front of opposition.
While legislative history can take many different forms, there are two
main types upon which courts rely. First, judges often either review
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"statements" made by legislators in reports issued by committees on
pieces of legislation, or review actual statements made on the assembly
or senate floor. Committee reports are meant to represent the consensus
view of a committee or legislature. Actual statements made by
legislators during debate can be persuasive if that individual played a key
role in developing the legislation.
The second main type of legislative history referenced by judges is
past drafts of bills or the sequence of development of legislation. Bills
can go through numerous revisions where certain terms or ideas are
either developed or eliminated. Judges will point to these alterations as
proof of a legislature's intentions. Judges have gone beyond these two
main types to find "legislative history" in almost any occurrence
connected to a bill.' Many judges have grown so dependent on
legislative history that one Supreme Court Justice remarked that because
the legislative history was ambiguous, "it is clear that we must look
primarily to the statutes themselves to find the legislative intent," rather
than the other way around.
The use of legislative history has been criticized for a variety of
reasons. Critics claim legislative history lacks legitimacy because it was
never voted on by a legislature or signed into law by an executive.
Instead, legislative history exists in the form of committee reports written
primarily by staff and read by few, if any, legislators. The "intent" which
judges find in these reports may have existed, but critics claim that in
many cases there was no collective intent to form the meaning assumed
to be evidenced in committee reports.
Critics also charge that legislative history is indeterminate, and,
therefore, subject to many possible interpretations. Because a bill

1. For the purposes of this paper, legislative history is defined as written materials
pertaining to the legislation. Judges will sometimes resort to their own experiences or recollection of the development of legislation, but that is not "legislative history" in the sense that
it can be referenced by another individual.
2. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971);
William T. Mayton, Law Among The Pleonasms: The Futility and A Constitutionality of
Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation,41 EMORY L.J. 113, 114 (1992). Mayton noted
that Justice Marshall, in whose opinion the above quoted remark is found, has generally been
true to the quote. Id. at 114. Mayton noted a study over the period 1971-79 which found that
Justice Marshall cited legislative histories 464 times, the highest number among Supreme Court
Justices in that period. Id. at 114, n.4 (citing Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S.
Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories:A StatisticalAnalysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J.
294, 306 (1982)). The study also noted that "Justice Brennan was also a big user (436 cites).
A more conservative member of the Court during this period, Justice White, referred to
legislative history fewer times (292 cites)." Id.
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involves the blending of many competing interests, there is often a
variety of statements or drafts covering a particular issue that could be
referenced by a judge as evidence of any number of views or trends,
even when no such particular view or trend actually existed.
The third major criticism of legislative history is that it is easy to
manipulate, both in its creation and in its interpretation. Committee
reports are primarily written by legislative staff These staff members
are in close contact with lobbyists who can provide "advice" in the form
of language to be added to final reports, language which no legislator has
seen. This objection to the use of legislative history (manipulation by
legislative staff) is different than the first objection (illegitimacy) that
finds fault with legislative history created by staff members even with the
best intentions. Manipulation can also occur when judges review past
legislative history. One can weave together a variety of unrelated
statements to form a coherent legislative intent where none really
existed. This manipulation can be intentional or unintentional when
stemming from the judge's natural biases. This objection is fundamentally different from the indeterminacy problem where judges with the best
intentions simply cannot find an accurate statement of the legislature's
intent.
The consideration of legislative history is more important than ever
as our legal system is flooded with a rising number of cases involving
statutory interpretation. As legislatures pass laws which are increasingly
complicated, courts are forced to deal with more complicated questions
of statutory interpretation. Legislative history can help clarify how
statutes were intended to operate and interact. Its use and misuse will
continue to be a central issue in judicial decisions.
In the midst of these developments, Justice Scalia was appointed to
the Supreme Court. While Justice Scalia had criticized the use of
legislative history during his term on the D.C. Circuit Court, he greatly
expanded his attacks once he was free of a higher reviewing court. His
recent opinions have set the tone of the legislative history debate. While
Justice Scalia has clearly established the presence of this debate in the
federal courts, little is written about how state courts deal with legislative
histories. State courts hear a tremendous number of cases each year
which involve statutory interpretation. The techniques state courts
employ and the philosophies they follow dictate how lawyers should
argue their cases. It is important to know if the changing trends in the
federal courts are carrying over to the state courts. This article first
addresses the philosophies of the two current and future leaders in the
debate over legislative history-Justices Breyer and Scalia-then it
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reviews the treatment and use of legislative history in Wisconsin state
courts to see if Justice Scalia's ideas have had any effect. As the leaders
of the opposing camps in the debate over legislative history, Justices
Breyer's and Scalia's future opinions will do more to shape the
continuing debate over legislative history than any other single factor.
Before turning to the views of Justices Breyer and Scalia, this article
briefly presents some general problems at the Supreme Court level that
arise from either relying too much on legislative history or ignoring it
completely. After addressing the views of the two Supreme Court
justices, this article discusses the formalist argument for textualism and
the analogy between contract law and statutory interpretation.
In its second major section, this article reviews the use of legislative
history in recent Wisconsin cases. Most state courts are similar in their
treatment of legislative history; however, Wisconsin courts have
interesting idiosyncrasies to consider when addressing questions of
statutory interpretation.
Finally, this article will briefly review the effects textualism and
Justice Scalia have had on other state courts. Several state courts have
systemically rejected the use of legislative history itself, rather than
simply criticizing its use in a particular case.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE SUPREME COURT
A tremendous number of Supreme Court cases represent poor use of
legislative history (either poor implementation or ignorance of legislative
history). The greatest tension is usually not between conflicting
legislative histories, but rather between the plain meaning of the statute
and the legislative history which suggests a meaning other than that
clearly in the text. These struggles have produced the greatest gulf in
opinions over the use of legislative history.
The case which most clearly provides the basis for ignoring the plain
meaning of a statute in favor of the supposed meaning contained in
legislative history is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States. 3 The

church had paid for an English clergyman to travel to the United States
and become its minister. In apparent violation of a federal statute
making it "unlawful for any person.., in any manner whatsoever, to
prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the
importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or
foreigners, into the United States ...to perform labor or service of any

3.

143 U.S. 457 (1892).

1996]

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

kind in the United States ... ."' While the statute prohibiting such
travel was broad, it did specifically include certain exceptions (e.g.,
professional actors, artists, lecturers, and singers), but clergy were not
included in this list.' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled "that a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers.",6 The Court, relying on legislative history (primarily a
committee report), found that Congress did not intend to exclude "brain
toilers," and, therefore, allowed the clergyman into the country.
Depending on one's point of view, the Holy Trinity Church decision
provided either a basis or an excuse for the Court to ignore the plain
meaning of a statute inits future decisions.
A. A Modern Abuse of Legislative History
A classic example of how legislative history was later used in
conjunction with the doctrine created in Holy Trinity Church is United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber' a case frequently mentioned by those
who worry about judges ignoring the plain meaning of a statute's text in
favor of twisting legislative history to support their own views.9 In
Weber, the Supreme Court considered whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 barred employers and unions from establishing
voluntary affirmative action programs; specifically, a plan for on-the-job
training which mandated a one-for-one quota for minority workers
admitted to the program. A majority of the Court ruled that the Civil
Rights Act did not bar such programs. 10 The specific Title VII sections
in question were sections 703(a)," 703(d), 2 and 703(j). 3 Writing for
4. William Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 629 (1990)
(quoting Act of February 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332.)

5. Id. at 629.
6. Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459.
7. Id. at 464; Eskridge, supra note 4, at 629.
8. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
9. See Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, DemocraticTheory and the Legislative
Process: Mourning the Death of Originalismin Statutory Interpretation,68 TuL. L. REV. 803
(1994).
10. United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 193.
11. Section 703(a), 78 Stat. 255, (codified as amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1994))
provides in pertinent part:
(a) ...It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
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the majority, Justice Brennan cited Holy Trinity Church stating that
reliance on the literal construction of sections 703(a) and (d) was
misplaced because, "[i]t is a 'familiar rule, that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.""' 4 Justice Brennan also
cited legislative history which supported his claim that opening employment opportunities for African-Americans was the purpose of the
statute; he argued that prohibiting all voluntary, race-conscious,
affirmative action efforts would defeat that purpose."a
Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented, criticizing
Justice Brennan for rewriting the statute to suit his preferences. Justice
Burger claimed that the majority simply ignored the plain language of
sections 703(a) and (d), which clearly prohibited hiring and work
preference practices based on race. 6 He continued by writing that "the
'hard' cases always tempt judges to exceed the limits of their authority,
as the Court does today by totally rewriting a crucial part of Title VII to
reach a 'desirable' result."17 The Chief Justice also provided a scathing
rebuke by quoting Justice Cardozo:
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not
to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will
in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to

any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 (a) (1994).
12. Section 703(d), 78 Stat. 256, (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1994)),
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or
employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d)(1994).
13. Section 703(j), 78 Stat. 257 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) (1994))
provides:
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
subject to this title to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20)(1994).
14. United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 201 (citing Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459).
15. Id. at 203-07.
16. Id, at 218 (Burger, J., dissenting).
17. Id.
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draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to
yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated
to "the primordial necessity of order in the social life." Wide
enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains.'
Justice Rehnquist also stated that the plain meaning of sections
703(a) and (d), which was acknowledged by the majority, should clearly
control; that is, when the language says an employer cannot consider
race, employers are clearly prevented from having racial quotas as they
did in United Steel Workers.
Justice Rehnquist went further in an exhaustive review of the
legislative history of Title VII, indicating that the majority had not even
properly cited legislative history. Two quotes exemplify the language
cited by Justice Rehnquist. Representative Cellar, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee and the Congressman responsible for
introducing the legislation, answered critics on the House floor: "The Bill
would do no more than prevent ...employers from discriminating

against or in favor of workers because of their race, religion, or national
origin.""H In the Senate, the floor manager of the bill, Senator Humphrey, said
The truth is that this Title forbids discriminating against anyone
on account of race. This is the simple and complete truth about
Title VII .... Title VII prohibits discrimination. In effect, it

says that race, religion and national origin are not to be used as
the basis for hiring and firing. Title VII is designed to encourage
hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race or
religion.'
More than anything else, United Steel Workers demonstrates that
judges with the best intentions can ignore the plainest language to arrive
at their desired policy result. If need be, judges can often find some
legislative history to provide just enough support for their opinion, even
when it appears that the majority of the legislative history points in the
opposite direction. United Steel Workers demonstrates an obvious case
of such manipulation, but the twisting of legislative history and blind
denial of a statute's plain language are usually not so blatant. It is easier

18.

Id. at 218-19 (Burger, J., dissenting) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE

OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1982)).

dissenting) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 1518 (1964) (emphasis
19. Id.at 233 (Rehnquist, J.,
added)).
20. Id. at 238 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964)).
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to abuse legislative history than to counter such abuse. By citing Holy
Trinity Church, a judge signals he or she is about to detour from the
plain meaning of the statute, but normally a lawyer or judge must dig
through reams of speeches or history to counter a contrived argument
based on faulty legislative history.
B. Problems With Ignoring Legislative History
Textualists create their own set of problems by ignoring legislative
history.21 Sometimes a statute's plain meaning leads to a result which
was not envisioned by the legislature, and legislative history provides the
clearest "red-flag" warning of this fact. Allen v. McCurry2 is a case
that demonstrates such a situation. The Supreme Court held in Allen that
the Full Faith and Credit Act binds a federal court in a civil rights suit
pursuant to section 1983 to the overlapping factual findings made by a
state court in a prior criminal prosecution against the federal civil rights
plaintiffs.' In writing the majority opinion, Justice Stewart found that
the passage of section 1983 did not repeal or restrict the traditional
doctrines of preclusion under collateral estoppel and that the Full Faith
and Credit Act would bind federal courts to state court findings.24 The
Court failed to find any language in section 1983 plainly providing a
different situation for such actions, nor found any mention of such an
exception in the legislative history of section 1983.2
Justice Blackmun's dissent, however, demonstrated that a review of
the legislative history illustrated an intent contradicting the "silence"
referred to by the majority. The purpose of section 1983 and the civil
rights laws were to allow the federal courts to step in because some state
courts were unable to provide adequate fora for race discrimination
cases.26 Consequently, it would defeat the purpose of the law to allow
state courts to make factual determinations which might tie the hands of
federal courts when those state courts were not trusted by Congress.
Consulting legislative history shows that not only the supporters27

21. See Redish, supra note 9, at 803.
22. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
23. Id. at 91. See also Redish, supra note 9, at 827-28.
24. Allen, 449 U.S. at 96-98.
25. Id. at 98.
26. Id. at 107-110 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
27. See, e.g., id. at 107 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting remarks of Rep. Coburn,
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1871)). Representative Coburn stated:
The United States courts are further above mere local influence than the county
courts; their judges can act with more independence, cannot be put under terror, as
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of section 1983, but also the opponents, understood the purpose of the
statute.29 This acknowledgment, coupled with the Court's recognition
that "[section] 1983 embodies a strong congressional policy in favor of
federal courts' acting as the primary and final arbiters of constitutional
rights,"3 led Justice Blackmun to conclude in his dissent that Congress
under
clearly did not envision biased state courts gutting actions brought
31
decisions.
previous
in
findings
factual
making
by
section 1983
While Allen demonstrates that ignoring legislative history can cause
problems, that is not an argument for regularly using legislative history.
As discussed throughout this article, there is a cost to making the review
of legislative history a routine step in statutory analysis.
III. THE SUPREME COURT TODAY
A. Justice Breyer's Views
As an established proponent of using legislative history to determine
the intent of a legislature when a statute is ambiguous, Justice Breyer has
written specifically on such use.31 His appointment to the Court
brought anticipation of charged debates between himself and Justice
Scalia over the use of legislative history. While Justice Breyer supports
using legislative history, his support is not open-ended. Justice Breyer
recognizes legislative history can be abused, but believes this abuse can
be contained:
I should like to defend the classical practice and convince you
that those who attack it ought to claim victory once they have
made judges more sensitive to problems of the abuse of legislative
history; they ought not to condemn its use altogether. They

local judges can; their sympathies are not so nearly identified with those of the vicinage; the jurors are taken from the State, and not the neighborhood; they will be
able to rise above prejudices or bad passions or terror more easily.
Id.
dissenting) (quoting remarks
28. See, eg., Allen, 449 U.S. at 107-108 n.5 (Blackmun, J.,
of Rep. Rice, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 396 (1871)). Representative Rice stated:
is but a bold and dangerous assertion of both the power and the duty of
[The bill]
the Federal Government to intervene in the internal affairs and police regulations of
the States and to suspend the exercise of their rightful authority .... It is at war
with the spirit of a republican Government.
Id.
29. Allen, 449 U.S. 107-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 110 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Stephen Breyer, On The Uses Of Legislative History In InterpretingStatutes, 65 S.

CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992).
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should confine
their attack to the outskirts and leave the citadel
33
at peace.
According to Justice Breyer, there is nothing inherently wrong with
judges using legislative history. Legislative history is one of many tools
a judge has to perform their tasks, but sometimes that tool is not
necessary.
In his analysis, Justice Breyer makes two assumptions. He assumes
that "appellate courts are in part administrative institutions that aim to
help resolve disputes and, while doing so, interpret, and thereby clarify,
the law.",34 Second, he assumes that "law itself is a human institution,
serving basic human or societal needs."35 Both of these assumptions
allow judges to call upon common values in order to achieve justice in
accordance with reasonable expectations. Most judges would not
disagree with these assumptions on their face, but the conclusions Justice
Breyer and his supporters draw from them are more controversial.
Justice Breyer identifies five primary situations in which judges use
legislative history: 1) To avoid an absurd result;36 2) To correct drafting
errors;37 3) To identify specialized meanings;"
identify the
"reasonable purpose" of the statute;39 and 5) 4)To Tochoose
among

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 847.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 848-49. Justice Breyer specifically refers to Green v. Bock Laundry Machine

Co. Id. The Court in Green used legislative history to determine that Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1),
which provides that evidence of a witness's prior convictions was admissible if the "court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the defendant," would be absurd if it applied to civil defendants, and found that the rule
only applied to criminal defendants. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co, 490 U.S. 504, 509
(1989) (emphasis added).
37. Breyer, supra note 32, at 850-51. Justice Breyer refers to United States v. Falvey and
the court's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §485. Id. In Falvey, the court found that a federal
criminal statute saying "[w]hoever ... possesses any false, forged, or counterfeit coin ... with

intent to defraud any ... person" was a drafting error and was not meant to protect against
fraudulent use of South African currency in the United States. United States v. Falvey, 676
F.2d 871, 875 (1st Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
38. Breyer, supra note 32, at 851-53. Justice Beyer refers to Pierce v. Underwood and
the Court's interpretation of the Equal Access to Justice Act. Id. Under the act, a private
party who wins a suit against the government is entitled to attorneys' fees unless the government's position was "substantially justified." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 556 (1988).
Justice Breyer claims that the Court used legislative history to find that the word "substantial"
meant "reasonable." Breyer, supra note 32, at 851-53.
39. Breyer, supra note 32, at 853-56. Justice Breyer refers to In re Arnold Print Works,

Inc. Id. Under Congress' 1984 revision of federal bankruptcy law, federal Article I
bankruptcy judges were allowed to hear and determine "core proceedings" without the consent of the involved parties. In re Arnold Print Works, Inc., 815 F.2d 165, 166 (1st Cir. 1987).
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reasonable interpretations of a politically controversial statute. ° Justice
Breyer claims the first three situations are relatively uncontroversial, but
he recognizes that the fourth and fifth uses, however, can be very
controversial. 4'
While Justice Breyer acknowledges that using legislative history has
some pitfalls, he argues that using legislative history is significantly better
than the alternative of relying primarily on canons of interpretation.
One criticism of the use of legislative history is that it lacks utility
because such history is often misused.42 Justice Breyer leaves this
charge largely unanswered. He claims that it has never been held that
legislative history is always useful-only that it sometimes is. 43 Justice
Breyer also states that many of those who argue against the use of
legislative history point to Supreme Court cases that involve complex
political issues and statutes with long legislative records.' However,
most cases heard by lower courts do not involve such politically-ladened
questions and the legislative history is often plain enough to clarify the
statute.45
Justice Breyer also disregards the two primary constitutional
arguments against the use of legislative history. First, while statutes are
passed by a majority of the legislature and signed into law by the
executive branch, no one votes on the legislative history which may
accompany a bill. The second constitutional argument against using
legislative history is that while power is vested in the elected members
of a legislature, legislative staff and lobbyists write the floor statements,
testimony, reports, and messages that make up the legislative history.
Justice Breyer believes that these arguments overstate their case.46
He sets aside the first criticism by conclusively stating that no one
The court used legislative history to define what constituted a "core proceeding." Breyer,
supra note 32, at 853-56.
40. Breyer, supra note 32, at 856-61. Justice Breyer refers to Local Div. 589 v.
Massachusetts. lId In Local Div. 589, the court used legislative history to determine that the
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 and its provision protecting the interests of employees
did not preempt Massachusetts law allowing the state's Transit Authority from negotiating
away certain powers it held. Local Div. 589 v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 645 (1st Cir.

1981).
41. Breyer, supra note 32, at 862.
42. ld.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 861-862. There is some truth to this, but there are plenty of complicated cases
heard in state courts which still make the use of legislative history problematic. See infra Parts
VI and VII.
46. Breyer, supra note 32, at 862.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:161

believes legislative history is the statute; rather, the legislative history is
helpful by providing guidance, much like a dictionary.47 Justice Breyer
also dismisses the second criticism against legislative history by stating
that each legislator is responsible for the work done by his staff and that
this safeguard normally prevents "renegade" staff who might try to make
policy on their own.4"
Another common criticism Justice Breyer addresses is the impossibility of ascertaining a collective legislative "intent" in general and the
misleading attempt to do so by pointing to one particular speech or
report.49 Justice Breyer acknowledges that it is very difficult to discover
the intent of a legislature, but maintains one certainly does exist.50
Discovering intent from individual statements requires knowledge about
the institution,5 and while most judges do not fully understand how the
legislative branch works and what should be considered significant in the
"horse-trading"2 world of the legislature, Justice Breyer believes this can
be overcome.1
Justice Breyer also claims that using legislative history is significantly
preferable to the alternative, which is to rely more heavily upon canons
of interpretation. 3 Relying on canons creates at least four problems
according to Justice Breyer. 4 First, for every canon there exists an
equal and opposite canon of construction. This was best illustrated by
Karl Llewellyn's famous list of canons with equally accepted canons that
would provide opposite results. 6 One example is the canon, "[w]here
various states have already adopted the statute, the parent state is
followed,"57 and the opposite canon, "[w]here interpretations of other
states are inharmonious, there is no such restraint."58 Another such
47. Id. at 863. This is a simplistic defense. While many judges recognize that the
legislative history is not the statue itself, they allow the legislative history to speak for the
statute and in effect take the place of the statute. See supra note 2.
48. Breyer, supra note 32, at 863-64.
49. Id. at 863-867.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Breyer, supra note 32, at 864-67. It should be noted that Justice Breyer is somewhat
of an expert in this area himself after having served on the staff of the Senate Judiciary
Committee for Senator Kennedy.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 869-874.
55. Id. at 869.
56. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
57. Id. at 402.
58. Id.
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canon is, "[e]very word and clause must be given effect,"' 9 and the
to the rest of
opposite canon, "[i]f inadvertently inserted or if repugnant
60
surplusage.
as
rejected
be
may
they
statute,
the
Justice Breyer briefly discusses three other problems.61 The sources
of many interpretive canons are old and obscure.62 Breyer questions
what validity a canon created in the nineteenth century has on statutes
as we move into the twenty-first century.63 Breyer also questions the
legitimacy of the Supreme Court to adopt new canons, such as those
proposed by Professor Cass Sunstein. 64 Finally, Justice Breyer doubts
that using canons actually helps those who either write or are affected by
legislation.65 He opines that the average citizen would "probably find
legislative history far more accessible than a Blackstone 'canon' based
upon eighteenth century land law.",66 While such canons might be
valuable if the U.S. had a more controlled drafting process like the
United Kingdom, the U.S. system is more disjointed and less prone to
hard and fast rules of interpretation. 67
Justice Breyer also claims that such a switch to canons would be
unfair.6" His charge is primarily grounded in the expectations of
legislators, judges and the general public as to how legislation is passed
and interpreted.69 The switch would certainly not be smooth. Justice
Breyer also claims legislative history allows for more public input and
that not relying on sources such as hearings would reduce public
influence in favor of powerful special interest groups.70 He assumes
there would simply be fewer hearings and that bills would suffer more
floor amendments (because of poor initial drafting at the committee
level), thereby creating disjointed legislation.71

59. Id-at 404.
60. Id
61. Breyer, supra note 32, at 870.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. See also Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the RegulatoryState, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 405 (1989). This criticism coupled with Justice Breyer's criticism of older canons
creates a catch-22 for judges using canons: Courts should not rely too heavily on old canons,
but also should not create new canons. What canons does this leave for Justice Scalia?
65. Breyer, supra note 32, at 870.
66. Id. at 870. This is questionable. It would certainly be cheaper for individuals to pay
their lawyers to research canons than to research legislative history.

67. Id-at 871.
68. Id. at 871-72.

69. Id. at 872.
70. Id. at 873.

71. Id.
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It is unclear why Justice Breyer believes there would be fewer
hearings. Legislators would still need assistance in formulating
legislation, but hearings and similar gatherings would not be used as
frequently by judges in later years as sources for the meaning of
statutory language. In the end, Justice Breyer tries to be sensitive to the
charges leveled by critics of the use of legislative history. "The 'problem'
of legislative history is its72'abuse,' not its 'use.' Care, not drastic change,
is all that is warranted.,
Justice Breyer has had few opportunities to write Supreme Court
opinions involving statutory interpretation. In those few cases, he has
looked, albeit not exclusively, to the legislative history of the statute to
help him determine the meaning of the language.
Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion in United States v.
Lopez7 3 (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg), where the
Court determined that the reach of the Commerce Clause was not so
broad as to allow the federal government to regulate the carrying of a
firearm within a certain distance from a school.74 He addressed
whether Congress could have had a rational basis for concluding that
having guns around a school sufficiently affected interstate commerce. 75
Put another way, "[c]ould Congress rationally have found that 'violent
crime in school zones,' through its effect on the 'quality of education,'
significantly (or substantially) affects 'interstate' or 'foreign commerce'?, 76 Even though Justice Breyer acknowledged that Congress
did not write specific "interstate commerce" findings into the law, he
referred to the large number of government and private reports and
government hearings which linked violence with poor education.77 With
so many reports, Justice Breyer concluded that
Congress could have found that gun-related violence near the
classroom poses a serious economic threat (1) to consequently
inadequately educated workers who must endure low paying
jobs,.., and (2) to communities and businesses that might (in
today's "information society") otherwise gain, from a well-educated work force, an important commercial advantage ...of a

kind that location near a railhead or harbor provided in the past.

72. Id. at 874.
73. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
74. l1& at 1626.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922 (g)(1), (0(6) (West
Supp. 1994)).
77. Id. at 1658-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Congress might also have found these threats to be no different
in kind from other threats that this Court has found within the
commerce power, such as the threat that loan sharking poses to
the "funds" of "numerous localities," and that unfair labor
practices pose to instrumentalities of commerce ....
The
violence-related facts, the educational facts, and the
economic
78
facts, taken together, make this conclusion rational.
However, such rationality is in the eye of the beholder. While reports
and hearings may illustrate a link, a majority of the Court found it was
unclear whether Congress intended a link when they passed the statute.
Consequently, the Court found that the law in question went beyond the
reach of the Commerce Clause. It is easy to point to many reports
linking factors and claiming causation of a harm, but it is harder to claim
that a network of research provided the intent for the entire Congress.79
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, ° Justice
Breyer, writing for a six-justice majority, ruled that the Federal
Arbitration Act was written broadly, thereby extending the Act's reach
to the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power."' This case is a
good example of how legislative history can be used to help expand the
reach of a statute, perhaps beyond Congress' intended scope. Many
states have passed statutes which invalidate pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that such clauses only
apply if the parties contemplated substantial interstate activity at the
time of contracting, thereby making it harder for contracting parties to
enforce a prior agreement to resort to arbitration.' The Supreme
Court overruled that decision, stating the purpose of the Federal
Arbitration Act was to overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements
to arbitrate. 3 The Federal Arbitration Act, section 2, provides that a
written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction.., shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract. 4
78. Id. (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971)).
79. See infra Part lI.B. for Justice Scalia's discussion of what actually constitutes "intent"
of the legislature.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
Id. at 836.
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354, 357 (Ala. 1993).
Allied-Bruce, 115 S. Ct. at 837.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (quoted in Allied-Bruce, 115 S. Ct. at 839).
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The Court concluded that "involving" should be defined broadly and was
the functional equivalent of "affecting. '"" Such a reading, according to
Justice Breyer, is in line with the Congressional intent in 1924 when the
statute was passed.86
As examples of legislative history, Justice Breyer quoted statements
from Congressmen.87 Justice Breyer also quoted remarks made at
Congressional hearings by individuals who were not legislators (the
chairman of the Committee on Arbitration of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York and the drafter for the American Bar
Association, whose language provided the basis for the federal bill) in
order to demonstrate legislative intent.88 Critics of the use of legislative
history would point to such examples because private individuals are not
elected and cannot demonstrate what 535 legislators believed the
language of a bill to mean. At the very least, statements made by
unelected officials should be viewed with caution.
Another case where Justice Breyer referenced legislative history was
Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Schlitz Brewing Co.89

That case dealt with the question of when interest begins to accrue after
the withdrawal of a company from a pension plan under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA). 90 The petitioner
(the pension plan) used legislative history, among other arguments, to
show the accrual date should be earlier because drafts of the legislation
specifically contained the later date, the actual bill lacked such language.91 The inference was that Congress ultimately rejected the later
date. Justice Breyer was forced to review the four different drafts of the
bill in order to conclude that the absence of the language calling for the
later date did not mean that Congress had changed its mind and opted
for the earlier date. Instead, Justice Breyer stated that the legislative
history and the evolution of the clause in question tended to point to the
opposite conclusion. 92
More recently, Justice Breyer used legislative history in his concur-

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Allied-Bruce, 115 S. Ct. at 839.
ld at 839-40.
Id. at 839.
Id. at 840.
115 S.Ct. 981 (1995).
ld at 982.
Id.at 992.
Id.

1996]

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

rence93 to Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia.94

The issues in

Morse centered on an interpretation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 95
The Republican Party of Virginia invited all registered Virginia voters
to become delegates to a convention to nominate the Party's candidate
for United States Senate upon payment of a registration fee.9 6 The
Appellants desired, and were qualified, to become delegates, but were
rejected because they refused to pay the fee.97 The Appellants brought
suit, alleging that the imposition of the fee violated sections 5 and 10 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.98

While a number of complicated issues surrounded Morse, the main
question was whether the coverage of section 5 encompassed the Party's
voting qualifications and procedures when its nominees were chosen at
a convention, i.e., whether the Party at the convention acted under
authority granted by the state of Virginia.99

Justice Stevens cited a

hearing record and floor statements from Representative Bingham,
whose floor amendment expanded the scope of the Voting Rights Act,
to illustrate the intention of Congress to expand the reach of the statute
to cover political party activity like that in Morse."° In his concurrence, Justice Breyer built upon the majority opinion (stating that the
term "State or political subdivision" encompassed political parties) and
bolstered his argument by referring to legislative history.10 ' He
mentioned the political conditions and the discrimination against
African-Americans at the time the bill was debated.0 " Justice Breyer
noted that the case-by-case enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment
93. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion which was joined by Justice Ginsburg.
Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence which was jointed by Justices O'Connor and Souter.
Justice Scalia wrote a dissent which was joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Kennedy wrote a
dissent which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent which
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, and which was joined in part by
Justice Kennedy.
94. 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1213 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
95. Voting Rights Act of 1965, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
96. Id at 119.
97. Morse, 116 S.Ct. at 1191.
98. § 5 requires that a "State or political subdivision" get pre-clearance from the
Attorney General for any new "voting qualification, or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting," in order to ensure that "such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 79 Stat. 439; 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
99. Morse, 116 S.Ct. at 1195.
100. Id. at 1200-01.
101. Id at 1214 (Breyer, J., concurring).
102. Id
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was failing to adequately deal with various political maneuverings by
southern political parties and that "[i]n 1965, to have read this Act as
excluding all political party activity would have opened a loophole in the
statute the size of a mountain.""03 Justice Breyer cited several quotes
from Representative Bingham, both from his hearing testimony and floor
statements, which clearly show that he intended the bill to include
political party activity, thereby closing this loophole.' °
It is interesting to contrast Justice Breyer's use of legislative history
in Morse to the statutory interpretation techniques used by Justices
Scalia and Thomas. In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the issue of
pre-clearance of political activity in this case "is not merely interpretation
of [section] 5 of the Voting Rights Act ....

but, inextricably bound up

with that interpretation [is] the First Amendment freedom of political
association."1 5 Justice Scalia claimed that the statute is ambiguous at
best, and noted the majority had "total disregard of the doctrine that,
where ambiguity exists, statutes should be construed to avoid substantial
constitutional questions."'

6

He concluded that regardless of the

legislative history, it was extremely doubtful "Congress would impose a
restraint bearing a 'heavy presumption against its constitutional validity'
in such a backhanded fashion-saying simply 'State[s]' and 'political
subdivision[s]' in [section] 5, but meaning political parties as well.""I°
In his dissent, Justice Thomas built upon Justice Scalia's argument.
First, Justice Thomas argued that "[w]hen words in a statute are not
otherwise defined," they "'will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.""0" Justice Thomas maintained that
"State" did not "encompass a partisan group, such as the Republican
Party of Virginia," and "political subdivision" referred to particular
geographic regions within a state, such as New York's Westchester
County." 9 Justice Thomas also relied upon the canon which states that
"'[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate

103. Id. at 1213 (Breyer, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 1214 (Breyer, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
106. Id. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1219 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 70 (1963)).
108. Id. at 1222-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37,
42 (1979)).
109. Id. at 1223 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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He noted that Congress used broader
inclusion or exclusion.""'"
language in section 11 of the Act ("[n]o person acting under color of law
"), but failed to be so specific in section 5 of the Act."'
....
Justice Thomas dismissed the statements by Representative Bingham
as unnecessary legislative history:
[V]oting does extend to casting a ballot for a party officer, but
only when that ballot is cast at a primary, special, or general
election. Since this is obvious on the face of the statute, I see no
need to resort to the legislative history of the Bingham Amendment. Though Representative Bingham may have had every
intention of covering the activities of political parties under
that he succeeded in transforming
[section] 5, there is no evidence
2
law."
into
intention
that
Typically, textualists focus on what the text actually says and not what
some of its sponsors intended it to mean, as can be seen below in the
discussion of the views of Justice Scalia. Justice Thomas specifically
reproves Justice Breyer for the logical inference in his concurrence which
stems from the legislative history."'

110. Id. at 1228 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,
23 (1983)).
111. Id. at 1228-29 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas drew a comparison between
the language in § 11 and the language in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where the state action doctrine was
incorporated. IL He argued that if Congress intended to incorporate the state action doctrine
in § 5 as well, it should have used similar language. Id. at 1228-29.
112. Id. at 1236 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 1234 n.18 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated:
Indeed, Justice Breyer's concurring opinion is founded on little more than sheer
disbelief that Congress passed a statute that does not go as far in terms of coverage
We are
as he thinks, in light of the history of voting rights, the statute should ....
not free to construe statutes by wondering about what Congress "would have wanted
to enact." There are myriad reasons why measures that "a Congress"-I assume
Justice Breyer means a majority of the members of that institution-might 'wan[t]
to enact' never become law. We must look to the extant text of the statute and see
what Congress has in fact, and not in theory, enacted.
In contrast to Justice Breyer's imaginary statute, which covers all actors that
might discriminate in the electoral process, § 5 is in reality limited to States and
political subdivisions .... Justice Breyer's argument thus boils down to the curious
notion that when Congress passes a statute that covers certain actors, it thereby
establishes a 'loophole' for all other .... I presume [Congress] was also cognizant
of the prohibitions of the First Amendment, as well as the constraints on its
legislative powers under the Fifteenth Amendment, not the least of which is the state
action requirement. Both of these constitutional limits on Congress' powers are
sufficient reason to curb speculation and to think it 'possible' (if the lack of textual
evidence were not enough) that Congress did not intend to cover political parties
under § 5.
Id. at 1234 n.18 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:161

One other case involving statutory interpretation and legislative
history for which Justice Breyer wrote an opinion is Varity Corp. v.
Howe."4 This case provides another effective illustration of the
differences between Justice Breyer's techniques and those of the
textualists on the Court. The plaintiffs in Varity Corp. were employees
and retirees who brought an action under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) against their corporate employer for
harming the plaintiffs through deliberate deception while acting as
fiduciaries."n Justice Breyer determined a number of terms used in
ERISA were ambiguous and turned to the legislative history for
guidance. The legislative history expressly stated "'[r]ather than
explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other
fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the
general scope of their authority and responsibility."'16 In each of the
three questions before the court, Justice Breyer looked to the legislative
history and then to the common law of trusts to find that (1) the
employer was acting as an ERISA fiduciary when it misled employees
regarding security of their benefits if they transferred, (2) the employer
violated fiduciary obligations of ERISA in misleading employees, and (3)
ERISA authorized lawsuits for individualized equitable relief."7
In a typical textualist dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices
Scalia and O'Connor, criticized the majority for looking past the plain
meaning of the statute." 8 Justice Thomas used canons of interpretation" 9 and the dictionary" to find meaning in the relevant sections
114. 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).
115. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1068.
116. Id. at 1070; H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, pp. 3-5, 11-13 (1973) (quoting Central States
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570
(1985)).
117. Id.at 1070-79.
118. See id. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. The first canon Justice Thomas used was:
[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general.
The law is settled that however inclusive may be the general language of a statute,
it will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the
same enactment. This is particularly true where, as here, Congress has enacted a
comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific
solutions.
Id. at 1081 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
Justice Thomas also relied upon a second cannon: "the Court violates yet another well-settled
rule of statutory construction, namely that 'courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes
that render language superfluous."' Id.at 1082 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Connecticut
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)).
120. Id. at 1086 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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of ERISA, and while not criticizing the majority for using legislative
history, Justice Thomas chose not to review it. He did, however, criticize
Justice Breyer's opinion for leaving the text of the statute too soon:
[t]hough we have recognized that Congress borrowed from the
common law of trusts in enacting ERISA we must not forget that
ERISA is a statute, and in "every case involving construction of
a statute," the "starting point ...is the language itself."

We

should be particularly careful to abide by the statutory text in this
case, since, as explained, ERISA's statutory definition of a
fiduciary departs from the common law in an important respect.
The majority, however, tells us that the "starting point" in
determining fiduciary status under ERISA is the common law of
trusts. According to the majority, it is only "after" courts assess
the common law that they may "go on" to consider the statutory
definition, and even then the statutory inquiry is only "to ask
whether, or to what extent, the language of the statute, its
structure, or its purposes require departing from common-law
trust requirements." This is a novel approach to statutory
construction, one that stands our traditional approach on its
head.
Justice Breyer responded by criticizing both the dissent's use of a
dictionary and interpretive canons: "Though dictionaries sometimes help
in such matters, we believe it more important here to look to the
common law, which, over the years, has given to terms such as 'fiduciary'
and trust 'administration' a legal meaning to which, we normally
presume, Congress meant to refer."" Justice Breyer's dismissal of the
use of canons follows the reasoning in his journal article defending the
use of legislative history."z
Canons of construction, however, are simply "rules of thumb"
which will sometimes "help courts determine the meaning of
legislation." To apply a canon properly one must understand its
rationale. This Court has understood the present canon ("the
specific governs the general") as a warning against applying a
general provision when doing so would undermine limitations
created by a more specific provision. 24
Justice Breyer found no evidence that Congress intended the specific
remedies in ERISA as limitations, rather than as possibilities."z
121. Id. at 1085 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
122. Varity Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 1072-73.
123. See infra Part II.A.

124. Varity Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 1077 (citations omitted).
125. Id at 1077-78.
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While other justices have defended the use of legislative history,
Justice Breyer is seen as having the greater role of acting as the new
counterweight to Justice Scalia's textualism. Justice Breyer stands for
the status quo or the conventional view of the use of legislative history.
His conventional view will increasingly be challenged by the new
textualists.
B. Justice Scalia's Views
By speaking out on the issue in 1987 and acting accordingly once he
joined the Court, Justice Scalia sparked the resurgence of the plain
meaning rule and the rejection of the use of legislative history. After
joining the Supreme Court he set a pattern of refusing to join in opinions
which relied upon legislative history, instead choosing to write his own
concurrences. Distrustful of legislative history, Justice Scalia borrowed
the metaphor of Judge Harold Levanthal to describe the use of
legislative history as "[t]he equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail
party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends."'"
Justice Scalia has been joined by Justice Thomas, and to a great
degree Justice Kennedy, in a general rejection of the use of legislative
history. 27 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor frequently
join Justice Scalia's opinions, but seldom rely on his approach in their
own opinions. The remaining four justices welcome the use of legislative
history. Justice Scalia has not written a definitive exposition on his views
of legislative history, but he has presented many pieces of his views in
various Supreme Court decisions. He finds a number of problems with
using legislative history. First, legislative history lacks legitimacy as it is
not the law itself."2 Second, even if legislative history were legitimate,
it is often prohibitively difficult to find a single true legislative intent by
studying the records.129 Finally, even if one could find such an intent,
legislative history is easily susceptible to 3manipulation
by staff and
0
lobbyists, and therefore it is untrustworthy.
According to Justice Scalia, the biggest problem with legislative

126. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. See, e.g., Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,254 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing Plain Meaning Rule as a "cardinal canon" in statutory interpretation); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court for departing from plain meaning in interpreting statute exempting certain medical
devices from patent infringement claims).
128. Conroy, 507 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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history remains its lack of legitimacy.' Scalia said it clearly in Conroy
v. Aniskoff, "[t]he greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.
We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislatures."" 2 It
is the language of the statute itself which is the law. "Judges interpret
laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the language
of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted
legislative intent."' 33 Justice Scalia finds judges too often go beyond
what is in the statute and ultimately enact the legislative history into law.
The problem is that legislative history has neither been debated nor
voted on by the legislature nor signed into law by the executive.
Scalia agrees that the Court should enforce the intentions of the
legislature, but he disagrees over what should be done to enact those
intentions. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,134 Scalia stated:
It is our task, as I see it, not to enter the minds of the Members
of Congress-who need have nothing in mind in order for their
votes to be both lawful and effective-but rather to give fair and
reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code,
adopted by various Congresses at various times.'35
To give credence to the statements of individual legislators circumvents
the entire legislative process: "An enactment by implication cannot
realistically be regarded as the product of the difficult lawmaking process
our Constitution has prescribed. Committee reports, floor speeches, and
even colloquies between Congressmen... are frail substitutes for
bicameral votes upon the text of a law and its presentment to the
President."' 36
Justices have sometimes gone beyond those types of legislative
history traditionally consulted to create "enactment by implication." In
her review of the use of legislative history during the 1981 Supreme
Court term, Patricia Wald listed several examples of how members of the
Court have drifted toward using unusual sources of legislative history.'37 In Justice Powell's dissent in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

131. Conroy, 507 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring)
132.

itL

133. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

135. Pennsylvania, 491 U.S. at 30; but see Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S.
Ct. 1114 (1996).
136. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J.,concurring)
(citations omitted).
137.

Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981

Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195 (1983).
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Smith, Inc. v. Curran,"8 he wrote that "the only 'unambiguous evidence
of Congress' intent" was a chart prepared by the "'expert committee
'
The majority in American
staff' and used to advise the legislators."139
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson cited Justice Department memoranda and
interpretative memoranda by two senators."4 The majority in American Tobacco Co. "also cited statements by one senator known to be
'technically incorrect' but deemed appropriate to show the thrust of the
bill," and cited "remarks about the bill that were made before the
amendment at issue was even introduced," based "on the theory that,
because its sponsor said [the amendment] did not alter the meaning of
the bill, anything said about the bill earlier was also valid evidence of the
meaning of the amendment."' 4 ' The Court even found relevance in
the amount of time it took to consider legislation. In American Tobacco
Co. the Court noted the "months of labor" in drafting the bill,'42 and
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the
Court pointed out that the bill finally enacted "was the result of a series
of last-minute conferences."' 43 Such examples, from just one Supreme
Court term, demonstrate that when courts begin to consult legislative
history they go too far in order to find meaning.
Even if one were to accept that legislative history is a legitimate
source to determine the intent of the legislature, Justice Scalia argues
that such an exercise can cause more problems than it solves: "[N]ot the
least of the defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy. If one were
to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, was more
likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising
candidate than legislative history.""
This confusion is increased, in part, due to the difficult task of finding
a proper limit to the scope of inquiry into legislative history in some
cases. One example can be found in Conroy v. Aniskoff,4 where the
Supreme Court interpreted the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to
find that a member of the armed services need not show that his or her
138. 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).
139. Wald, supra note, 137, at 204 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Curran, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1854 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
140. Id. at 204 n.74 (summarizing American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63,71-73
& n.15 (1982)).
141. ld.
142. American Tobacco Co., 456 U.S. at 68. See also Wald, supra note 137, at 204 n.74.
143. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 61 n.12

(1982).
144. Conroy, 507 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145. 507 U.S. 111 (1993).

1996]

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

military service prejudiced his or her ability to redeem title to his
property before he or she could qualify for suspension of time to redeem
under that Act.' 6 In Conroy, an Army officer, who had been on
active duty, but not at war, failed to pay local property taxes for three
years and lost his home acquired to the town.'47
The majority based its decision on four pieces of legislation: 1) The
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918 ("1918 Act");' 2) the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 ("1940 Act"); 49 3) The
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942;15 ° and 4)
the Selective Service Act of 1948.1" Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment because of the plain meaning of the statute, but reviewed the
legislative history to demonstrate that the majority had misinterpreted
Congressional intent and that the majority claim had contradicted the
plain meaning of the statute. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia pointed
out that legislative history is inherently "open-ended.",112 Justice Scalia
stated in Conroy that
one could go back further in time to examine the Civil War-era
relief Acts, many of which are in fact set forth in an appendix to
the House Report on the 1918 Act ....Or one could extend the
search abroad and consider the various foreign statutes that were
mentioned in that same House Report. Those additional statutes
might be of questionable relevance, but then so too are the 1918
Act and the 1940 Act, neither of which contained a provision
governing redemption periods. 5 3
His point is that, in many cases, ending legislative history research is
merely an arbitrary decision that itself has no particular rhyme or reason,
but might still have a significant effect on the final decision.
Justice Scalia also argues that judges can create an intent for the
legislature where none truly existed:
[T]he quest for the "genuine" legislative intent is probably a
wild-goose chase anyway. In the vast majority of cases I expect
that Congress neither (1) intended a single result, nor (2) meant
to confer discretion upon [an administrative] agency, but rather
(3) didn't think about the matter at all. If I am correct in that,
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.at 511-18.
Id
40 Stat. 440 (1918).
54 Stat. 1178 (1940).
56 Stat. 769 (1942).
62 Stat. 604 (1948).
Conroy, 507 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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then any rule adopted in this field represents merely a fictional,
presumed intent, and operates principally as a background rule of
law against which Congress can legislate."5
Justice Scalia also has a unique definition of legislative intent. He
does not regard legislative intent to be what the legislature wanted the
language to mean per se, but rather what the legislature understood the
language to mean. This requires a judge to look at all of the surrounding law:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have
been understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress;
but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord
with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have
been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the
words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it),
and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into
which the provision must be integrated - a compatibility which,
by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind.'55
To this end, Justice Scalia has specifically criticized the use of
committee reports, which is the most commonly referenced type of
legislative history. "[W]e are a Government of laws not of committee
reports"; 156 committee reports are "unreliable" as "a genuine indicator
of congressional intent; 57 and they d[o] not necessarily say anything
about what Congress as a whole thought .... [W]e have no way of
' 58

knowing that they had any rationalmotive at all.'
It is also generally known that legislators have little or no involvement in writing committee reports. Justice Scalia made this strikingly
clear when he sat on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals by citing the
exchange between Senators Dole and Armstrong, a passage which is now
famous among those who study the use of legislative history.'59
154. Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517.
155. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
156. Id. at 2490.
157. Id.
158. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J.,

concurring).
159. Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Justice Scalia quoted the
following text as an "illuminating exchange ... between members of the Senate, in the course
of floor debate on a tax bill":
MR. ARMSTRONG: ...My question, which may take [the chairman of the
Committee on Finance] by surprise, is this: Is it the intention of the chairman that
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Often when committee reports are quoted, the entire meaning of a
statute is drawn from such quotes. Justice Scalia argues that this places
too much reliance upon a few quotes. It is not "conducive to a genuine
effectuation of congressional intent" to "give legislative force to each
snippet of analysis" contained in legislative history."6
Even if judges could routinely gain knowledge from legislative
history, Justice Scalia argues that such history is easily and frequently
manipulated by the judicial branch: "We use [committee reports] when
it is convenient, and ignore them when it is not,' 6' and it is "dangerous to assume that, even with the utmost self-discipline, judges can
prevent the implications they see from mirroring the policies they favor"

the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court and other courts take guidance as
to the intention of Congress from the committee report which accompanies this bill?
MR. DOLE: I would certainly hope so ....
MR. ARMSTRONG: Mr. President, will the Senator tell me whether or not he
wrote the committee report?
MR. DOLE: Did I write the committee report?
MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes.
MR. DOLE: No; the Senator from Kansas did not write the committee report.
MR. ARMSTRONG: Did any Senator write the committee report?
MR. DOLE: I have to check.
MR. ARMSTRONG: Does the Senator know of any Senator who wrote the
committee report?
MR. DOLE: I might be able identify one, but I would have to search. I was here
all during the time it was written, I might say, and worked carefully with the staff as
they worked ....
MR. ARMSTRONG: Mr. President, has the Senator from Kansas, the chairman of
the Finance Committee, read the committee report in its entirety?
MR. DOLE: I am working on it. It is not a bestseller, but I am working on it.
MR. ARMSTRONG: Mr. President, did members of the Finance Committee vote
on the committee report?
MR.DOLE: No.
MR. ARMSTRONG: Mr. President, the reason I raise the issues is not perhaps
apparent on the surface, and let me just state it: .... The report itself is not
considered by the Committee on Finance. It was not subject to amendment by the
Committee on Finance. It is not subject to amendment now by the Senate .... If
there were matter within this report which was disagreed to by the Senator from
Colorado or even by a majority of all Senators, there would be no way for us to
change the report. I could not offer an amendment tonight to amend the committee
report ....
[F]or any jurist, administrator, bureaucrat, tax practitioner, or others who might
chance upon the written record of this proceeding, let me just make the point that
this is not the law, it was not voted on, it is not subject to amendment, and we should
discipline ourselves to the task of expressing congressional intent in the statute.
128 CONG. REc. 8659 (daily ed. July 19, 1982).
160. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
concurring).
161. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J.,
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when relying on legislative history.162 An extreme example is seen in
Blanchard v. Bergeron,1 3 a case that involved whether the amount
awarded to a plaintiff for attorney's fees could be limited by prior
contingency fee arrangements."6 In finding that the arrangements did
not limit such awards, the majority referenced committee reports which
made fine distinctions between conflicting cases decided by lower
courts-stating that one court's statement was dicta while other courts'
statements were actual holdings. 16
Justice Scalia attacked such
reasoning with dripping sarcasm in his concurrence:
I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members of
Congress read either one of the Committee Reports in question,
even if (as is not always the case) the Reports happened to have
been published before the vote; that very few of those who did
read them set off for the nearest law library to check out what
was actually said in the four cases at issue (or the more than 50
other cases cited by the House and Senate Reports); and that no
Member of Congress came to the judgment that the District
Court cases would trump Johnson on the point at issue here
because the latter was dictum."6
Justice Scalia pointed out that most language in reports is inserted by
committee staff members-either on their own initiative or at the request
of a lobbyist. 67 "What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer,
to know that his or her citation of obscure district court cases can
transform them into the law of the land."'"
Another case where
Justice Scalia pointed to abuse of legislative history is Chisom v.
Roemer.169 In Chisom, the Court debated whether elected judges are
considered "representatives" for the purposes of the Voting Rights
Act. 7
Petitioners from Louisiana argued that the unique voting
scheme in that state provided African-Americans, members of a
protected class, with "less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representa-

162. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 192 (Scalia, J., concurring).
163. 489 U.S. 87, 90 (1989).
164. Id. at 90.
165. Idt at 92-93.
166. Id. at 98 (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
170. Id. at 383-84.
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tives of their choice."'" The majority defined "representative" as one
who wins a popular election and pointed to legislative history to show
that judges are not expressly excluded from coverage under the
statute." Justice Scalia strongly criticized the majority for starting the
case with an expectation of what the statute means and then finding
legislative history and a counterintuitive definition to support that
The term "representative" might mean judge, but that
expectation.'
is not the ordinary meaning of the word:
[O]ur job is not to scavenge the world of English usage to
discover whether there is any possible meaning of "representatives" which suits our preconception that the statute includes
judges; our job is to determine whether the ordinary meaning
includes them, and if it does not, to ask whether there is any solid
indication in the text or structure of the statute that something
other than the ordinary meaning was intended. 74
Justice Scalia goes on to argue that a representative connotes one who
is not only elected by the people, but who also, at the minimum, acts on
Judges do not represent the people in the
behalf of the people.
ordinary sense, argued Justice Scalia, as that is done by the prosecutor. 76 Thus, the majority was able to ignore contrary legislative history
in order to support their preconceived outcome.
Ironically, Justice Scalia has also been guilty of selective reading of
legislative history. Justice Scalia consulted legislative history in Edwards
v. Aguillard'" to show that the Louisiana legislature had a legitimate
"secular purpose" in enacting a statute that required the teaching of
creation science in the public schools.'78 Justice Scalia wrote "[t]he
legislative history gives ample evidence of the sincerity of the Balanced
Treatment Act's articulated [secular] purpose."' 79 However, it was
believed by many that the legislative history was intentionally kept clean
of any references to a religious purpose. Justice Scalia was manipulated
by the legislative history himself, just as he warned that judges may be
manipulated.
171. Id.at 388 (quoting League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v.
Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 625 (1990)).
172. Id.at 391-94.
173. Id.at 405 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. I&L at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id
176. Id. at 410-11.
177. 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 631.
179. Id.
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Justice Scalia maintains that even if one learns the intent of the
legislature by consulting the legislative history, this does not prove the
usefulness of such an exercise:
It should not be thought that, simply because adverting to the
legislative history produces the same result we would reach
anyway, no harm is done ....
We should not make the equivalency between making legislative history and making an amendment [to the statutory text] plausible. It should not be possible,
or at least should not be easy, to be sure of obtaining a particular
result in this Court without making that result apparent on the
face of the bill which both Houses consider and vote upon, which
the President approves, and which, if it becomes the law, the
people must obey. I think we have an obligation to conduct our
exegesis in a fashion which fosters that democratic process.'o
Members of Congress have been known to avoid the amendment process
in favor of using legislative history instead. Justice Scalia pointed this
out in US. v. Taylor,8 where the majority alluded to floor debate
containing the following quote: "Mr. Dennis ... I have an amendment
here in my hand which could be offered, but if we can make up some
legislative history which would do the same thing, I am willing to do
82
it.",
Such a practice is misleading enough when spoken on the floor of the
House of Representatives or the Senate. The practice is significantly
more misleading when members of Congress are able to place statements
in the record without having to speak in front of the entire chamber.
Such statements can go unnoticed by other members and staff and can
serve to mislead judges who are not familiar with congressional
operations.
Legislators and their staff can easily plant faulty legislative history,
and in fact they do. In a criticism of extensive use of legislative history,
Senator Orrin Hatch, now Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
stated that "[e]very legislative staff member wants to write a speech or
report that determines the outcome of a future case."'" To provide an
example of what can happen in Congress, Senator Hatch presented the
180. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 345 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 41795 (1974)).
183. Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 44 (1988). While Senator Hatch criticized the use of legislative history,
he did condone its careful use. "Authoritative legislative history can serve to focus the general
words of a statute to the specific harms it is meant to correct. In this sense, legislative history
is an integral part of the lawmaking process." Id. at 47.
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case of NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco" and the subsequent action in
Congress. The Supreme Court in Bildisco decided that a collective
bargaining agreement may be unenforceable when a business files for
bankruptcy.ls" In subsequent legislation "[t]here was a general agreement in Congress for compromise legislation that would preserve
Bildisco when necessary to protect creditors, and overrule the case when
necessary to prevent the use of artificial bankruptcies to avoid a union
contract."' 6 Ultimately Congress came to a consensus and passed
legislation. However, one senator who did not like the compromise
introduced into the Congressional Record
a lengthy brief explaining that the new standard completely overturned Bildisco, something that everyone agreed was not the
intention of Congress ....It was a lengthy legalistic presentation
complete with citations delivered by one member of the Senate
on a matter upon which no other senator had ventured to
comment. This speech was simply dropped into the record; the
senator who had it placed there knew that if he had introduced
it into the debate a number of us would have stood up and stated
that the insertion was incorrect. Clearly, then, this was an
attempt to influence future cases. At best, it was the view of one
member and not the view of the entire Congress. At worst, it
was the unreviewed opinion of an unelected senate staff member,
probably composed with the help of a number of very shrewd
union intellectuals. 187
It is clear that legislators, staff and private lobbyists will try to skew the
public record by planting such remarks in the legislative history. Judges
who are not as familiar with legislative games like this one might easily
be persuaded by faulty legislative history."

184.
185.
186.

465 U.S. 513 (1984).
IdL at 516-17.
Hatch, supra note 183, at 44.

187.

lt at 44-45.

188. Some judges have been wary of such "invented" legislative history created by staff
and legislators. Judge Kozinski on the 9th Circuit Court stated that "[t]he propensity of judges
to look past the statutory language is well known to legislators. It creates strong incentives
for manipulating legislative history to achieve through the court results not achievable during
the enactment process. The potential for abuse is great." Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d
concurring). See also Mayton, supra note 2, at 113,
1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J.,
n.5; National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 618 F.2d
819, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[I]nterest groups who fail to persuade a majority of the Congress
to accept particular statutory language often are able to have inserted in the legislative history
of the statute statements favorable to their position, in the hope that they can persuade a court
to construe the statutory language in light of these statements.").

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:161

However, Justice Scalia does not strictly adhere to his own rule
against using legislative history, as he envisions cases where legislative
history can actually be useful. Scalia does allow judges to consult
legislative history in order to avoid an absurd result:
[I] think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials,
including the background of Rule [of Evidence] 609(a)(1) and the
legislative history of its adoption, to verify that what seems to us
an unthinkable disposition.., was indeed unthought of, and thus
to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning of the word
"defendant."' 8 9
While it may be true that legislative history could help a court avoid an
absurd result, there is nothing to prevent that legislative history from
being misleading as Justice Scalia warns.
Rather than relying upon legislative history, Justice Scalia prescribes
his own brand of textualism. He endorses a two step method which uses
ordinary meaning and canons of interpretation to find the meaning of
the language:
[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual
context; and second, using established canons of statutory
construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that some
permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies. If
not-and especially if a good reason for the ordinary meaning
appears plain-we apply that ordinary meaning."9
Justice Scalia allows for the consideration of policy as well:
[T]he "traditional tools of statutory construction" include not
merely text and legislative history but also, quite specifically, the
consideration of policy consequences .... Surely one of the most
frequent justifications courts give for choosing a particular
construction is that the alternative interpretation would produce
"absurd" results, or results less compatible with the reason and
purpose of the statute. This, it seems to me, unquestionably
involves judicial consideration and evaluation of competing
policies ... to determine which one will best effectuate the
statutory purpose. Policy evaluation is, in other words, part of
the traditional judicial tool-kit... the step that determines.., whether the law is indeed ambiguous."
While only Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy reject legislative

189. Green, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 515.
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history, their behavior has affected Supreme Court opinions as a whole.
Even justices that support the use of legislative history often have
refrained from mentioning it in order to form coalitions and get a
majority of votes for their decisions.
Building upon statistics from earlier research, Professor Thomas
Merrill of the Northwestern University School of Law published the
following chart to demonstrate there is a definite trend on the Supreme
Court away from using legislative history."9
Textualism in the Supreme Court, 1981-1992
Term

Total Statutory Interpretation
Cases

Cases Making
Substantive
Use of Legislative History

Cases Not
Mentioning Legislative
History

Cases Relying
on Dictionaries

1981

69

69 (100%)

0 (0%)

1 (1%)

1988

71

53 (75%)

10 (14%)

9 (13%)

1992

66

12 (18%)

41 (62%)

22 (33%)

While most Supreme Court justices avidly defend the use of legislative
history, there has been a very significant drop not only in the use of
legislative history, but also the substantive use of legislative history.
While the use of dictionaries cannot be directly equated with adherence
to textualism, it is an important tool used in textualism and the increase
in use of dictionary definitions by the Supreme Court indicates a trend
toward textualism in recent years. Therefore, having only two or three
textualists on a court can have a tremendous effect on how the Court as
a whole uses legislative history.
IV.

THE FORMALIST ARGUMENT FOR TEXTUALISM

The risk that judges use legislative history improperly and arrive at
an incorrect result is just one danger in using legislative history. The
other danger is that courts will use legislative history to improperly usurp
power from both the legislative and executive branches. The primary
192. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351, 355 (1994). See also Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195 (1983); Patricia M.
Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in ConstruingStatutes in the 198889 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1990).
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concern is maintaining the power of the legislative branch, but the
executive branch is often involved in the political machinations which
create legislation, and, therefore, also has a stake in whatever compromise is enacted. This formalist argument is grounded in democratic
theory, but can also be seen theoretically in the light of general contract
law-with the enacted legislation acting as the "contract" between the
political factions.
The statutes which come from the legislative branch are often the
product of extensive and detailed negotiations. Multiple compromises
are built into any statute and this creates a fragile agreement over the
language.'93
In studying a statute for its meaning (and the compromises), it is
important to remember that the legislative branch of government is also
a political branch. Members of Congress "will put the privileges and
facilities of their respective chambers to political as well as legislative
uses."' 94 Legislative history presents the danger of introducing the
supposedly non-political courts into the political process of legislation. 9 ' The judicial branch is not supposed to make their decisions
using political considerations or entangle itself in political controversies.'96 Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, wrote:
I will let you in on an obvious secret. Statements by a single
senator that are not the subject of debate are often included in
the record to satisfy a constituent who was not happy with the
outcome of the law. Politics often demands these gestures, but
they are not a meaningful part of the legislative process. This
means senators will make political, as well as legislative, speeches.
Unfortunately, a judge could potentially seize upon that unreliable comment in the Congressional Record to arrive at a
preconceived result. 97
Courts have to remember that not every utterance found in
committee reports or the Congressional Record may be assumed to
193. See Hatch, supra note 183.
194. InternationalBrotherhoodof ElectricalWorkers, Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814
F.2d 697, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring).
195. Kenneth W. Starr, ObservationsAbout the Use of Legislative History, 1987 Duke
L.J. 371, 376.
196. William T. Mayton, Law Among The Pleonasms: The Futilityand Aconstitutionality
of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 41 EMORY L.J. 113, 138 (1992) (citing
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvery Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
197. Hatch, supra note 183, at 45.
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Even judges, confined to the printed
represent "statutory gold."' 9'
page and lacking knowledge of the inner workings of the legislature, who
want to find the proper result may not always be able to "separate
legislative wheat from political chaff" and discard the remarks meant
only for certain political constituencies.'"
Comments made for political purposes are not the only problem
encountered when deciphering the statutory compromises from
legislative history. Another problem is that the sources themselves are
limited in scope of vision. Judges like to refer primarily to committee
reports to find the intent of Congress. Then U.S. Court of Appeals
Judge Kenneth Starr pointed out that:
[t]hese records, however, at best can shed light only on the
"intent" of that small portion of Congress in which such records
originate; they therefore lack the holistic "intent" found in the
statute itself. Thus, although congressional committees are
reservoirs of expertise and technical knowledge, by the same
token committees may be narrow and parochial in their outlook,
less balanced on the subject in question than the Congress as a
whole.'
Judges who want to accurately find the "intent" of Congress would still
be misled by such materials.
Judge Starr stated, "[l]egislative history, however, has the potential
to mute (or indeed override) the voice of the statute itself. In terms of
democratic theory, the use of legislative history can distort the proper
voice of each branch of our constitutional government."' °1 With
legislative history, courts are able to overpower the plain meaning of a
statute in the name of the original intent of the legislature. One such
method is to seek out a broad policy goal embodied in the legislative
history and use that broad goal to give detailed meaning to specific
clauses, even when the language does not support such a meaning.'

198. InternationalBrotherhood,814 F.2d at 715 (Buckley, J., concurring).
199. Id at 717 (Buckley, J. concurring).
200. Starr,supra, 195, at 375.
201. Id at 375.
202. Such concern was expressed by Judge Starr in Natural Resources Defense Counci4
Inc. v. United States EnvironmentalProtection Agency where he answered the EPA's broad
policy based interpretation by writing:
It would be illegitimate for the judiciary, in pursuit of some overriding Congressional
goal (such as eliminating water pollution), to tear asunder a specific provision which
Congress saw fit to enact. It scarcely needs repeating that statutes are rarely, if ever,
unidimensionally directed towards achieving or vindicating a single public policy.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
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Another tactic legislative history allows for is to read earlier statutes
as if they had been enacted by recent congresses.' Judge Easterbrook
criticized this technique in his dissent in Marozsan v. United States:
The technique starts by putting a hypothetical question to the
minds of deceased legislators who never thought about it while
they were living-let alone while they were in Congress assembled. These ghostly legislators always give the answer the
questioner prefers; they are in no position to do otherwise. Their
"answer" becomes the basis for insisting that the statute they
actually wrote be construed consistently with the views we have
put in their mouths-for they did not deny that they wanted the
statute construed consistently with the answer they did not give!
Yet the fact that they did not answer a question that was not
asked of them does not grant us the authority to disregard the
answer they gave to the question that was asked."°
Judge Easterbrook has pointed out that this method is inherently
biased:" 5 "First, the court may choose when to declare the language
of the statute 'ambiguous' ..

..

Second, the court may choose the

hypothetical question to put to the legislative body. Third, the court has
endless flexibility in selecting who is asked the question.""° Rather
than asking a median legislator, courts invariably put the hypothetical
question to the most fervent supporters of a particular position.' °
Judge Easterbrook argues that the very novelty of a question suggests
the legislature did not answer it, and, therefore, legislative history should
not be of any assistance. 8
By relying upon legislative history, judges alone are able to override
the democratic machinations of the legislature which has cut out a
compromise after long and hard debate. This elevates language that has
not been passed by the entire legislative body to take on disproportionately important meaning. Justice Scalia is not the only one to attack
the use of legislative history for its lack of legitimacy.' ° Judge Easterbrook maintains that the process of legislation was the most important

822 F.2d
203.
204.
205.

104, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
See Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1498 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11

HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988).

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 62-63.
Id.at 63.
Id. at 66.
See supra Part II.B.
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achievement of the Constitution.21 James Madison said in Federalist
No. 10 that the cumbersome process of legislation is the best safeguard
against error; a process through which people wrestled for power in a
Republic with many loci of power was, he thought, the best way to tease
public spirit out of self-interested voters.2 ' Finding the intent of the
legislature in legislative history, rather than in the words of the statute,
circumvents the entire process designed to safeguard the democratic
process. Justice Frankfurter made this point eloquently when he said,
"no one will gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to
ascertain the meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond
it is to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected
legislature." '
So how should legislative history be used, if at all? It is important to
remember that, as Judge Easterbrook maintains, "[s]tatutes are law, not
evidence of law." ' Justice Holmes stated this years ago: "[w]e do not
inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute
'
means."214
This is essentially the Scalia view. 15
Legislative history can be helpful to discover the meaning of
particular words in a statute, but it should not be used to find the intent
of a statute. Put another way, "[t]he process is objective; the search is
not for the contents of the authors' heads but for the rules of language
'
they used."216
Judge Easterbrook spelled out at length when and why

legislative history can be useful in In re Sinclair:
What "clearly" means one thing to a reader unacquainted with
the circumstances of the utterance-including social conventions
prevailing at the time of drafting-may mean something else to
a reader with a different background. Legislation speaks across
the decades, during which legal institutions and linguistic
conventions change. To decode words one must frequently
reconstruct the legal and political culture of the drafters.
Legislative history may be invaluable in revealing the setting of
the enactment and the assumptions its authors entertained about
how their words would be understood. It may show, too, that
210. Easterbrook, supra note 205, at 64-65.
211. lId at 65 (citing The FederalistNo. 10 at 77-81 (J. Madison)).
212. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. Rnv.
527, 533 (1947).
213. In re Russell E. Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989).
214. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,12 HARv. L. Rnv. 417,
419 (1899).
215. See supra Part II.B.
216. In re Matter of Sinclair,870 F.2d at 1342.
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words with a denotation "clear" to an outsider are terms of art,
with an equally "clear" but different meaning to an insider. It
may show too that the words leave gaps, for short phrases cannot
address all human experience; understood in context, the words
may leave to the executive and judicial branches the task of
adding flesh to bones. These we take to be the points of
cases ... holding that judges may learn from the legislative
history even when the text is "clear." Clarity depends on context,
which legislative history may illuminate.2 17
This use of legislative history should be much more narrow and focused
than that prescribed by traditional defenders of legislative history like
Justice Breyer.218
V.

THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
AND CONTRACTS

Another way to think about the interpretation of a statute is to
stated
analogize it to the interpretation of a contract. Judge Easterbrook219
contracts:
like
treated
be
should
statutes
that
article
journal
in a
Statutes are not exercises in private language. They should be
read, like a contractual offer, to find their reasonable import.
They are public documents, negotiated and approved by many
parties in addition to those who write the legislative history and
statute, and not the intent
speak on the floor. The words
' ' of the
of the drafters, are the "law. 2
If statutes are analogized to contracts, one can look at the purpose of
contract law to help learn the benefit of following the political agreement
made between parties voting on a statute. While there are many
theories as to the purpose of contract law, two leading theories are the
"enforcement of expectations" theory and the "economic efficiency"
theory.
The enforcement of expectations theory has been advanced by many
scholars, most notably Arthur Corbin and Allan Farnsworth. Corbin
maintains that "[tihe [m]ain [p]urpose of [c]ontract [f]aw [i]s the
[r]ealization of [r]easonable [e]xpectations [i]nduced by [p]romises. ' ' 21
Likewise, Farnsworth wrote that the good faith obligation serves to

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
1993).

Id. at 1342.
See supra Part II.A.
Easterbrook, supra note 205, at 60.
Id.
Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1.1, at 2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed

1996]

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

prevent a party from being "deprived of his reasonable expectations."''
Along the same lines as the expectation theory, Llewellyn saw the
purpose of contract law as helping to achieve maximum economic
efficiency, stating that the "most vital single aspect of contract law" is
working against the contract dodger, who interferes with the free flow of
commerce. 23 These two views reinforce one another, because as
contract law enforces parties' expectations, economic efficiency is
promoted.
What does contract theory have to do with legislative history?
Legislative factions who vote on bills are similar to parties who contract
with one another. Each has interests for which it enters into negotiations. The political compromises created are a tangible and important
aspect of any final piece of legislation. The political players expect their
compromises to be preserved, just as parties that contract with one
another expect the respective promises made to be honored. If
legislators see that judges do not always honor the political compromises
that were made, it leads to less efficient negotiating within the legislature. Each side must then take their own steps to guard against a
misinterpretation of any particular political compromise. The other
result is that in some cases political compromise may be frustrated
altogether. In other words, democracy functions less efficiently.
To illustrate this point, imagine the case of a controversial (affirmative action) bill coming before a legislature. One side may favor a more
aggressive, pro-affirmative action position; while the other side may
support a less aggressive, but still pro-affirmative action, position. There
may be room for compromise between these two positions and language
could be passed into law effectuating that delicate compromise.
However, if legislators favoring the less-aggressive position worry about
judges ignoring the plain meaning of the statute, those legislators may
hesitate to make a political deal, or they may refuse to make a deal at
all. If legislators fear that judges might not honor a democratic
compromise, then everybody loses.
A similar analogy can be made to the laws of trusts and estates. The

222. E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 669 (1963).
223. Allen R. Kamp, Between-The-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism,
and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REv. 325, 337 (1995) (quoting Karl
N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?- An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L. J. 704, 725 n.47

(1931)).
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wishes of individuals expressed in their wills are honored not just
because of libertarian notions of personal property, but also to serve as
an incentive to bring forth creativity, hard work, initiative, and ultimately
productivity, which benefits society as a whole. 4
Therefore, one of the main purposes of valuing prior agreements,
whether in contract law, estate law, or statutory interpretation, is not just
to honor the past agreement itself, but also to promote certain desirable
conduct in the present and future. This is a forward-looking purpose
which stems from looking back at the prior agreement.
If statutes are analogized to contracts between the various political
factions, judges should consider evaluating legislative history in terms of
the parole evidence rule and other similar contract rules. As with
contracts, judges would assume that the statute is a final expression of
agreement between the political factions involved in the debate. Judges
would also assume that each statute is a complete integration for the
purposes of a "statutory parole evidence rule." Each statute contain an
inherent "merger clause" which would indicate that all prior communications (or legislative history) are "merged" into the written agreement.
The language of the statute would adequately reflect the legislative
history.
Just as with interpreting contracts, judges should follow the general
rule that an integrated agreement overrides previous inconsistent
agreements.2 - It is important to remember that the parole evidence rule
does not preclude use of extrinsic evidence offered for the purpose of
lending meaning to contract terms. As with earlier agreements, legislative
history may help in the interpretation of the statute, but it may not
contradict it.226 However, if agreements or comments in legislative
history are inconsistent with the language of the statute, the statute (or
the integrated agreement) should control.
The rules for interpreting ambiguous terms in a contract are
analogous to those for interpreting an ambiguous statute. Where the
contract is ambiguous, parties may introduce evidence of specific
statements and agreements to show the intended meaning of contract
terms. The general application of this principle is rather narrow,
however, because it is applicable only where the court is unable to

224. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Death, Taxes and Family Property 5-7 (E. Halbach ed.
West Publishing Co., 1977), reprinted in JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON,
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 16 (4th ed., Little Brown and Company, 1990).
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213(1) cmts. a & b (1981).
226. Id. at § 214(c) 215 cmt. b.
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interpret the contract. If the meaning of the contract is plain and
unambiguous, such evidence should not be admitted to assist in its
interpretation.
The method of dealing with an ambiguous contract term is important
because of the nature of the inquiry. Judges study extrinsic evidence to
discover the meaning of the contract terms, not to find the intent of the
parties. This contract inquiry is the same inquiry prescribed by Judge
Easterbrook when interpreting a statute. 7 In reading a contract, a
judge would not throw out the text of the contract and start to reconstruct the intent of the parties on their own. A judge must stick to the
guideposts to find their way. A parole evidence view of statutory
interpretation, which corresponds to Judge Easterbrook's statutory
interpretation method, allows the judge to honor the "contract" made
between the political factions who made compromises and passed the
statute and does not discourage legislators from making their political
compromises.
VI.

WISCONSIN STATE COURTS

While state courts hear a large percentage of the total number of
cases in this country and state legislatures are passing an increasing
number of statutes requiring judicial interpretation, very little attention
has been paid to the use of legislative history at the state court level.
This may be partly because state legislatures typically generate legislative
history which is smaller in volume and less complicated to review than
their federal counterpart. This may also be because state courts do not
hear as many politically-charged cases which typically lend themselves to
abuse or misuse of legislative history.
It is interesting to use Wisconsin for a study of the use of legislative
history at the state court level because on the continuum of state courts,
its system would be considered typical in its treatment of legislative
history. Wisconsin state courts have not expressed direct opposition to
using legislative history to interpret a statute, such as that exhibited by
Justice Scalia, but many of the state's judges do not abuse legislative
history per se. While Wisconsin is typical, there are certain important
idiosyncrasies litigators should be aware of when arguing in Wisconsin
state courts.
Wisconsin courts do not immediately rely upon legislative history. In
Wagner Mobil, Inc. v. City of Madison, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin

227. See supra Part IV.
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stated:
The aim of all statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of
the legislature. In ascertaining a statute's meaning, our first
inquiry is to the plain language of the statute. If the language of
the statute clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative
intent, it is the duty of the court to apply that intent to the case
at hand and2not look beyond the statutory language to ascertain
its meaning. 21
The Court continued, "[o]nly when the statutory language is found to be
ambiguous will this court examine the scope, history, context, subject
matter229and object of the statute in discerning the intent of the legislature.1
Wisconsin courts are given tremendous latitude to judge ambiguity
ina statute:
A statute, or portion thereof, will be found to be ambiguous when
it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed
persons in either of two or more senses. In considering the
question of ambiguity, however, it is obvious that parties may
disagree as to the meaning of a given statute. This alone cannot
be controlling. The court should look to the language of the
statute itself to determine if "well-informed persons" should have
become confused."
Legislative history is taken very seriously by Wisconsin courts and
sometimes has risen to the level of dictating decisions. One interesting
example is State v. Hufford, where the Court of Appeals ruled that
Wisconsin's "restitution statute" was not actually meant to provide
restitution for victims, but instead was intended to provide less. 3 ' The
issue in Hufford was whether a trial court in a criminal matter had the
authority to impose interest as part of a restitution award. z 2 The

228. 527 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Wis. 1995) (quoting Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 500
N.W.2d 264, 266 (Wis. 1993)).
229. Id. at 304 (citing Cynithia Er. v. LaCrosse County Human Services Dep't, 493
N.W.2d 56, 59 (Wis. 1992)).
230. Id. (quoting National Amusement Co. v. Department of Revenue, 163 N.W.2d 625,
628 (1969)).
231. State v. Hufford, 522 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
232. Wis Stat. subsection 973.20(1) provides that the trial court, when imposing sentence
or ordering probation, "shall order the defendant to make full or partial restitution to any
victim of the crime." Wis STAT. § 973.20(1) (1987). Under subsection 973.20(5)(a), the trial
court may order the defendant to pay "all special damages, but not general damages,
substantiated by evidence in the record, which could be recovered in a civil action against the
defendant for his or her conduct in the commission of the crime." WIS. STAT. § 973.20(5)(a)
(1987).

1996]

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

original state restitution statute (Wis. Stat. 1979-80, section 973.09(8)(c))
expressly provided for interest, but the 1981 amendment (Wis. Stat.
1985-86, section 973.09) removed any mention of a victim receiving
interest-which the Hufford court took as clear sign of legislative intent
to do away with the provision for interest. 3 This restitution statute
was in turn repealed and replaced with the current language which was
specifically patterned after the federal restitution statute but incorporated
parts of the former Wisconsin restitution statute (the 1981 amendment).
The question which plagued the Hufford court was whether the
legislature intended to reintroduce what it had
expressly repealed six
34
years before by blending these two statutes.2
The court's task was complicated by the fact that neither the 1987
Wisconsin Judicial Council Note (the promulgator of the new statute) on
the relevant section nor the minutes of the Council's Restitution
Committee addressed the specific restitution issue. While the federal
statute is also silent on the issue of providing interest, federal courts have
uniformly construed the federal restitution statute to include interest.
The State argued that the term "special damages" included interest for
victims, but the Hufford court noted that the federal statute did not
include the term "special damages. '""
Without expressed legislative
intent of a return to providing for interest, the court refused to
implement such an interpretation. The Hufford court admitted that "we
are not happy with the result, and that a 'make whole' remedy for the
loss of money should.., include interest as well as the present value of
money.' ' 1 6 Ultimately the court concluded "[w]ere we writing on a
clean slate, without the baggage of our legislative history, we would rule
the same way [as the federal courts]. The federal courts were not so
saddled [with the same legislative history]."

7

As a result, the Wiscon-

sin restitution statute does not provide restitution. One must ask what
kind of "baggage" do the Wisconsin courts carry when they bring along
legislative history (or as in Hufford, a lack of legislative history), and
does this baggage help more than it hinders in finding the true intention
of the state legislature?
While Wisconsin courts have generally not found ambiguity where
none exists, there have been cases where a court has simply ignored

233. Hufford, 522 N.W.2d at 27.
234. Id

235. Id. at 28.
236. Id.at 29.
237. Id
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plain meaning and then manufactured a result from an intricate web of
legislative history. One of the best examples is the majority opinion by
the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in Grosse v. Protective Life Insurance
28
Co. 3
In Grosse, the widow Grosse filed action to collect life insurance
proceeds from a policy issued to her deceased husband. Her husband
had passed the exam performed by Protective Life's medical examiner,
but he learned he had cancer before making the first payment of his
premium. The issue before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was
whether Protective Life was estopped under sec. 632.50, Wis. Stat., from
asserting as a defense the deceased's change of health between the time
of the exam and the first payment of his premium.
The majority's opinion, written by Justice Bablitch, found Wisconsin
Statute section 632.50 to be ambiguous. Section 632.50 states:
If under the rules of any insurer issuing life insurance, its medical
examiner has authority to issue a certificate of health, or to
declare the proposed insured acceptable for insurance, and so
reports to the insurer or its agent, the insureris estopped to set up
in defense of an action on the policy issued thereon that the
proposed insured was not in the condition of health required by
the policy at the time of issue or delivery, or that there was a
preexisting condition not noted in the certificate or report
"239

The insurance company had no expressed policy as to whether or not its
examiners could bind the company.
The insurance company contended that the statute only applied when
an insurance company has enacted formal rules authorizing its medical
examiners to declare an applicant fit for insurance. The widow Grosse
contended that "the statute applie[d] even when an insurance company
has no formal rules but authorize[d] its medical examiner to declare an
applicant fit for insurance by soliciting the examiner's opinion in a
written medical report.' 21 The majority opinion relied on a wide
variety of types of legislative history to ultimately rule in favor of the
widow Grosse. The court found the original statute in 1911 was based
upon an Iowa statute and quoted an 1899 Iowa Supreme Court case.
The court then cited a passage from the minutes of the Insurance Law
Revision Committee (ILRC), a Legislative Committee created by the

238. 513 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 1994).
239. Wis. STAT. § 632.50 (1991-92) (emphasis added).
240. Grosse, 513 N.W.2d at 596.
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legislature to study and revise the insurance laws.24' However, the
majority opinion read the ILRC passage and gave it a new third
interpretation- different from both the petitioner's and the respondent's
interpretations.242 Finally, the court cited a paper presented by a former
member of the Industry Advisory Committee (another committee
involved in the revision process) to the Association of Life Insurance
Counsel in 1977. The majority opinion acknowledged that "statements
from non-legislative sources do not carry as much probative value as
'
official statements,"24
but the Court continued:
When... a contemporaneous report or other document from a
nonlegislative agency or even a private party forms a vital link in
the chain of legislative history of a particular statute, such
unofficial report or other document may be used to determine the
legislative intent behind the statute. 244
The majority opinion ultimately ruled that the insurance company
was estopped from offering evidence of changed condition. The Court
ruled the statute estopped insurers unless they promulgated rules stating
that their medical examiners did not have the authority to bind the
company.
The dissent in Grosse written by Justice Steinmetz (and joined by
Justices Wilcox and Geske) accused the majority of ignoring a basic rule
of statutory interpretation: if a statute is clear on its face, do not look to
the history of the statute when interpreting it.245 The dissent argued
that the legislature had amended the statute to reduce the insurance
industry's liability in response to an earlier decision by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin. The language of the statute clearly states that
companies are only liable if they have rules providing authority to their
examiners to bind the company (which the respondent did not have in
this case). The dissent accused the majority of attempting to circumvent
the language of the statute by finding the language ambiguous and then
examining sources of legislative history.Y
This statute is not ambiguous. What more must the legislature
say in order to limit estoppel to situations where the medical

241. The Court noted that an official comment by a legislation-created committee is valid
evidence of legislative intent. Md at 598. See also Ball v. District No. 4, Area Board, 345
N.W.2d 389 (Wis. 1984).
242. Grosse, 513 N.W.2d at 598.
243. Id. at 599.

244. Id. at 599 (quoting Ball, 345 N.W.2d at 389) (emphasis added).
245. Grosse, 513 N.W.2d 601 (Steinmetz, J.,
dissenting).
246. Id.
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examiner acts pursuant to rules of the insurance company, than
"[i]f under the rules of any insurer issuing life insurance ...
Must the legislature say "we really mean it?"'247
Even though the dissent acknowledged that its inquiry could end with
the plain meaning of the statute, Justice Steinmetz presented legislative
history to support the plain meaning of the statute. The dissent cited a
committee comment which stated, "'[i]t is made less severe as against the
insurer by binding the insurer only if the medical examiner is acting
This quote made it that much clearer
under the insurer's rules."''
that legislative history (at best) is often indeterminate, and (at worst) can
be manipulated by judges to reach a result in opposition to the plain
meaning of a statute.
The practice of reviewing legislative history even when the language
of the particular section is clear is encouraged by certain Wisconsin court
practices such as the "alternative plain meaning rule." What was later
termed the alternative meaning rule can be found in City of Madison v.
Town of Fitchburg:"[t]his court has consistently stated that the spirit or
intention of a statute should govern over the literal or technical meaning
of the language used." 249 In City of Madison, the majority had to
interpret Wisconsin Statute section 62.05 governing the categorizing of
cities into distinct classes. Evoking the alternative plain meaning rule,
the majority relied upon a 1923 opinion of the attorney general to
interpret apparently plain language in the statute-claiming the attorney
general presented the correct analysis of the law."0
Reliance upon the alternative plain meaning rule did not pass without
criticism. In her dissent, Justice Abrahamson not only attacked the
presented legal genesis of the alternative plain meaning rule,"1 but she
also attacked the practical use and result of such a rule:
In this case, the court does not-and cannot-say that the
statutory language is ambiguous, thwarts the manifest purpose of
the statute, or leads to an absurd result. Thus the plain meaning
rule, a rule which has its critics, including myself, but which this
court invariably uses.., governs. If there ever was a situation

247. Id. at 601 (Steinmatz, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 601-02 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
249. 332 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
250. Id at 787-88.
251. "The majority attempts to derive this canon from the Leicht, Skubitz, and
Mussallem cases, the last two of which rest on Leicht. These cases do not stand for the
proposition that this court can be guided by the statute's 'spirit' when it chooses to ignore the
words." Id. at 790 (Abrahamson, J. dissenting).
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for application of the rule, this is it. I am concerned that the
court fails even to attempt to establish a coherent approach to the
problem of statutory interpretation. This case... cannot help
but confuse lawyers and legislators. 2
Justice Heffernan wrote a brief dissent which was a less analytical, but
more strongly worded criticism of the majority opinion and its approach. 53
The alternative plain meaning rule survived and has occasionally
been used by Wisconsin courts to interpret statutes. Some courts have
even added the alternative plain meaning rule as a second step of
statutory analysis-first determining the plain meaning of a rule, and
then applying the alternative plain meaning rule to confirm and support
the plain language of the statute.2
While the alternative plain meaning still exists in Wisconsin
precedent, it has been criticized and has not been widely used to
circumvent the plain meaning of the statute. One recent example is
Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Madison Metropolitan School District,where

the Court of Appeals rejected the Defendant-Appellant's argument
looking past the plain meaning of the statute and relying on the
alternative plain meaning rule. 5 The court stated that the inquiry is
more complicated: "Taking into account 'purpose' merely aids determining the legislature's intent. To describe the search for purpose as an

252. Id.at 790-91 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 790 (Heffernan, J., dissenting). Justice Heffernan stated:
I differ from Justice Abrahamson only to the degree that she asserts that the
majority's error stems from ignoring the literal language of the statute. I am
compelled to conclude that the problem is not one of literalness, but of literacy. The
majority's conclusion defies the expressed will of the legislature and a common sense
understanding of the English language.
id.
254. See Mullen v. Coolong, 393 N.W.2d 110,113-14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, Nicholson v. Home Ins. Cos., 405 N.W.2d 327 (Wis. 1987).
255. 541 N.W.2d 786, 795-96 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). The court elaborated on its
philosophy by citing a treatise on statutory interpretation:
Considerations of what purpose legislation is supposed to accomplish are often
mentioned as grounds for the interpretation given to a statute. Explanation of the
purpose is a way of focusing attention on an insight about intent or meaning.
Judicial Frustration, if not usurpation, of legislative authority, may be the result of
reflexive judicial construction arrived at exclusively by considering the language of
the statute on the basis of the judge's own received impressions as to what the
language means, without regard for the purpose of the act and other aids of
interpretation.
Id. (citing SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Vol 2A, § 45.09 (5th ed. 1992)).
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'alternative rule' overstates the reason for the search.",1 6
When Wisconsin courts find ambiguity in a statute, they are allowed
to carry out a very broad search for the statute's true meaning. In
addition to examining the language of the statute, the court must look
at the scope, history, context, subject matter, and purpose of the
statute.7 This has led Wisconsin courts to review questionable sources
of legislative history. One such example is referring to analysis by the
Legislative Reference Bureau.
The Legislative Reference Bureau's analysis of legislation is much
like Congressional committee reports which are criticized by Justice
Scalia, except that such analysis doesn't have the pretense of being
written by elected officials (even though Congressional committee
reports are written and mostly read by Congressional staff). The
Legislative Reference Bureau's analysis of state legislation is required by
Wisconsin Statute section 13.92(1)(b)2." 8
Wisconsin courts have ruled that an analysis of a bill by the
Legislative Reference Bureau is indicative of legislative intent.2 9
Picking strands of language from bureau analysis approximates picking
strands of language from committee reports. The bureau's interpretations are often followed by courts, but members of the bureau are not
elected officials.
Sometimes bureau analysis is clear to understand-stating the
purpose of particular sections. One example can be seen in McLeod v.
State of Wisconsin. 6° In McLeod, the Court of Appeals ruled that the

battery-to-a witness statute applied to future witnesses as well as past
witnesses. 261 The McLeod court justified its ruling with the plain
meaning of the statute and canons, but the court also felt the need to

256. Madison Teachers, Inc., 541 N.W.2d at 795.
257. State ex rel Sielen v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 499 N.W.2d 657, 659
(Wis. 1993).
258. Wis. STAT. § 13.92(1)(b) (1979). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Drafting section. The legislative reference bureau shall provide drafting services
equally and impartially and to the limits of its facilities and staff. In the performance
of its drafting services, the bureau shall:
2. Prepare in plain language an analysis of each original measure, to be printed
with the measure when it is introduced.
Id.
259. Chernetski v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 515 N.W.2d 283, 287 n.3
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (referring to McLeod v. State of Wisconsin, 271 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1978)).
260. McLeod, 271 N.W.2d at 160.
261. Id.

1996]

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

support its conclusion with legislative history. The court cited analysis
by the Legislative Reference Bureau which stated, "Purpose: This
statute is aimed at the organized criminal practice of preventing
witnesses from testifying in grand juries or at trials.""26 This bureau
analysis settles the issue of whether the statute dealt with both past and
future witnesses.
Another typical example of the use of analysis by the Legislative
Reference Bureau can be found in Chernetski v. American Family
Mutual Insurance Co., where the court had to determine whether bicycles
in a crosswalk have the same rights and duties as vehicles do toward
other vehicles.2' The analysis of the Legislative Reference Bureau
does not always have the most solid basis, even though it can be afforded
significant deference. In White Hen Pantry v. Buttke,2" the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin consulted the analysis of the Legislative Reference
Bureau to find that ninety days prior written notice is required under the
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law to terminate a franchise arrangement due
to nonpayment of sums.265 The analysis of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law did not actually come from the bureau. The initial draft of the
law was submitted to the bureau by the Governor's Legal Counsel. That
original draft contained a provision "substantially similar" to the present
section in question.266 The commentary by the Governor's Legal
Counsel was adopted by the bureau as its own, and accompanied the bill
which passed the state legislature.267 In essence, the real legislative
history for the bill came from the Governor's office, but was presented
as coming from the non-partisan Legal Reference Bureau. Care must be
taken to see where and how the Legal Reference Bureau received its
analysis.
Wisconsin courts have obviously not found every statute to be
ambiguous. One good example is Bell v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.
Bell, in part, involved whether Wisconsin
of Des Moines, Iowa.'
Statute sections 102.29(4) and (5) allows an extension of the statute of
limitations when another state's statute of limitations applies for a

262. Id. at
BILL 859).

160 (quoting LEGISLATIVE

REFERENCE BUREAU, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY

263. Chernetski, 515 N.W.2d at 283.
264. White Hen Pantry v. Buttke, 301 N.W.2d 216 (Wis. 1981).
265. Id.

266.
267.
268.
Ct. App.

md at 221.
Id. at 220-21.
Bell v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, 541 N.W.2d 824 (Wis.
1995).
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personal injury action against a third party by an injured employee in the
event that the insurer has failed to promptly notify certain appropriate
parties.2 69 Both sides agreed that Employers Mutual failed to promptly
notify the appropriate parties. The court found that section 102.29 was
unambiguous and that the three year extension to the statute of
limitations only applied when the applicable statute of limitations is
Wisconsin Statute section 893.54, but in this case the applicable statute
was an Iowa state statute.27 The plaintiffs argued that the history of
section 102.29(5) and its earlier versions indicated that there was a
drafting error in the current version. However, the court found that the
statutory language was unambiguous, and that "[1]egislative history
cannot be used to demonstrate that a statute, unambiguous on its face,
'
is ambiguous."271
There are other examples of Wisconsin courts finding statutes to be
unambiguous. In Voss v. City of Middleton, 2 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin found that the word "abutting" was unambiguous and it did
not describe the situation between two adjoining pieces of property in
the city of Madison and the city of Middleton-thereby preventing
Madison from vetoing Middleton's action to vacate a street within their
own city limits. 73

In Graziano v. Town of Lonq Lake,2 74 the Court

of Appeals found that when a town meeting "authorizes" a town board
to take a particular action, it unambiguously does not "compel" a town

269. WIS. STAT. SEC. 102.29 (1989). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(4) If the employer and the 3rd party are insured by the same insurer.., the
employer's insurer shall promptly notify the parties in interest and the department
(5) An insurer subject to sub. (4) which fails to comply with the notice provision of
that subsection and which fails to commence a 3rd party action, within the 3 years
allowed by §893.54, may not plead that §893.54 is a bar in any action commenced by
the injured employee under this section against any such 3rd party subsequent to 3
years from the date of injury, but prior to 6 years from such date of injury...
Id.
270. Bell, 541 N.W.2d at 831.
271. Id. at 832. It is interesting to note the precedent for this point. Judge Vergeront
cited the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Martin for this proposition. Id. In Martin, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court stated this proposition and then, in a manner of speaking,
immediately ignored it by reviewing legislative history in Martin to show that an unambiguous
statute was indeed unambiguous. State v. Martin, 470 N.W.2d 900, 905 n.5 (Wis. 1991).
However, Judge Vergeront in Bell followed the plain meaning of the legal proposition and
refused to review legislative history-choosing to follow the words and not the actions of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. Bell, N.W.2d at 832.
272. 470 N.W.2d 625 (Wis. 1991).
273. Id.
274. 530 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
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board to take that action.275

Even though Wisconsin courts have expressly stated that they should
not use legislative history when the meaning of the statute is plain, courts
have found a way to circumvent this rule and use legislative history. In
State v. Martin,76 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found that Wisconsin Statute section 973.12(1) unambiguously stated that repeater amendments could not be made to charges against defendants after they had
pleaded not guilty to the underlying charges. 7 The court ignored its
rule of refusing to consult legislative history when the statute is
unambiguous:
Section 973.12(1) is not ambiguous. We undertake an historical
analysis only for the purpose of demonstrating that the legislative
history makes clear that no repeater charge can be added after
any plea: While legislative history cannot be used to demonstrate
that a statute unambiguous on its face is ambiguous, there is no
converse rule that statutory history cannot be used to reinforce
and demonstrate that a statute plain on its face, when viewed
historically, is indeed unambiguous.27
This referral to legislative history to support a finding of an unambiguous
statute has been followed by the Court of Appeals.279
It is unclear what purpose such a referral to legislative history serves.
If it confirms the court's view, then such an inquiry was an unnecessary
crutch for the court's decision. If the legislative history contradicts the
plain meaning of the statute, the court is not able to allow the legislative
history to overrule the plain meaning which has been passed into law.
Justice Scalia finds such an inquiry to be more than simply excessive:
[Use of legislative history to confirm an apparent plain meaning]
is not merely a waste of research time and ink; it is a false and
disruptive lesson in the law. It says to the bar that even an
"unambiguous [and] unequivocal" statute can never be dispositive; that, presumably under penalty of malpractice liability, the
oracles of legislative history, far into the dimmy past, must always
be consulted. This undermines the clarity of law, and condemns
litigants (who, unlike us, must pay for it out of their own pockets)
to subsidizing historical research by lawyers .... [N]ot the least

275.

Id.

276. 470 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. 1991).
277. I&
278. Id. at 905 n.5.
279.

See Novak v. Madison Motel Assocs., 525 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
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of the defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy.'
At worst, allowing for such an inquiry provides an opportunity for judges
to go back (behind the scenes) and reclassify what they originally
thought to be unambiguous to actually be ambiguous, and then to rule
accordingly (and ignore the plain meaning). Such an abuse of legislative
history is very difficult to definitively identify.
One of the major criticisms of legislative history by Justice Scalia and
others is that it is indeterminate; often conflicting with itself or allowing
for multiple interpretations.2s This can be seen in Kyle S.G. v.
Carolyn S.G., a case where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, among
other issues, had to decide whether Wisconsin Statute section 48.415(1)(a)(3) created a rebuttable presumption of abandonment of a child by
The
their parents-once several conditions were demonstrated.'
majority opinion, written by Justice Bablitch, found that the presumption
existed in section 48.415 and was evidenced both in the language of the
statute and the legislative history. The court cited both an earlier draft
of the statute and analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of the
early drafts which specifically stated that such a presumption existed.'
The majority opinion assumed that if the presumption had been
mentioned before in an earlier draft, that existence would carry over to
later drafts.
The dissent in Kyle reviewed the same legislative draft and reached
the opposite conclusion. In the dissent, Justice Abrahamson referenced
the explicit creation of a presumption of abandonment in the early drafts
but noted that version was rejected by the legislature (it was not

280. Conroy, 507 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring).
281. See supra Part II.B.
282. 533 N.W.2d 794 (1995). Wisconsin Statute subsection 48.415(1)(a)(3) provides that
abandonment may be established by a showing that: (1) the child has been left by the parent
with a relative or other person; (2) the parten knows or could discover the whereabouts of the
child; and (3) the parent has failed to visit or communicate with the child for a period of one
year or longer. WiS. STAT. § 48.415(1)(a)(3) (1993).
Wisconsin Statute subsection 48.31(1), provides that the party seeking to terminate
parental rights must prove these basic facts by clear and convincing evidence. WIS. STAT. §
48.31(1) (1993). Once these facts are established, section 48.415(1)(c) provides that the
showing "may be rebutted by other evidence that the parent has not disassociated himself or
herself from the child or relinquished responsibility for the child's care and well-being." Wis.
STAT. § 48.415(1)(c) (1993). That is, the natural parent may rebut the presumption of
abandonment with evidence of non-disassociation.
283. Kyle S.G., 533 N.W.2d at 798 (quoting Drafting record, Laws 1979, ch. 330:
"'Abandonment may be presumed wherever the child is found in circumstances which manifest
that the parent has left the child with the clear intent to disassociate himself or herself from
the child and to relinquish responsibility for the child."')
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mentioned whether the early version was actually voted on by the
legislature or it simply did not become law).' 4 The dissent noted that
the legislature adopted a "substantially different" bill which made no
mention of the presumption.' Thus, the dissent drew the conclusion
that "the legislative history evidences that the legislature discarded the
presumption approach to abandonment in favor of a different tack." 6
Whether that was true is certainly unclear. What is clear is that the
court's in-depth forage into the Wisconsin State Law Library microfiche
to dust off old drafts of bills which themselves were never passed is a
technique which is questionable at best.
An ambiguous statute does not mean that Wisconsin judges must
automatically resort to legislative history. While most judges go right to
a statute's history, some judges under certain circumstances choose not
to reference legislative history even when the statute is ambiguous.
Judge Vergeront on the Court of Appeals chose to only reference the
dictionary and the statute's context to interpret an ambiguous statute to
enforce an order terminating a parental right in Interest of Rhonda R.D.
v. Franklin.'
In Rhonda R.D., the mother had separated from her husband who
resided in Franklin, Washington, and took their child with her to
Wisconsin. Ultimately she received a divorce and custody of their child,
and then petitioned to terminate Franklin's parental rights on grounds
of abandonment. Under Wisconsin law abandonment may be established
by a showing that
The child has been left by the parent with a relative or other
person, the parent knows or could discover the whereabouts of
the child and the parent has failed to visit or communicate with
the child for a period of one year or longer.2 9
While Franklin had not had contact with his son for a number of
years,29 he argued that his son had been taken from him and not left
with his mother. Chapter 48 did not contain a definition of "left," and

284. Id. at 801.
dissenting.)
285. Id.at 801 (Abrahamson, J.,
286. Id.
287. 530 N.W.2d 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
288. The term "relative" is defined under Wisconsin Statute subsection 48.02(15) to
include a parent. WIS. STAT. § 48.02(15) (1994).
289. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(1)(a)(3) (1994).
290. A jury had found that Franklin, contrary to his testimony, had not adequately tried
to contact his child over the years. Rhonda, R.D., 530 N.W.2d at 43-45. At the time of the
trial, Franklin could not try to visit his child because he was in prison in Washington. lt
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the majority found that its ordinary meaning in the dictionary was
ambiguous.29'
To resolve this problem, the majority used a Scalia-style analysis.
After looking at the context and purpose of the statute expressed in its
text, the majority determined that the jury's definition of "left with" was
the correct one, deciding that the key was not how the child ended up
with the relative, but rather what the surrendering parent did afterwards.292 At no point did the majority look to legislative history to
make their determination.
The dissent in Rhonda R.D., however, relied heavily upon legislative
history to resolve the ambiguity. In the dissent, Judge Dykman focused
on the fact that Christopher D. was "taken" from Franklin (not "left"
with the mother for all of those years) and that the section in question
was not ambiguous.293 Even if the section were ambiguous, the dissent
claimed the purpose of the statute found in the legislative history pointed
toward a narrow definition of the word "abandonment," and a greater
hesitancy by the legislature to separate children from parents. 94
The legislative history relied upon by Judge Dykman was a compilation of memos by a private lobbying organization and a comparison of
drafts presented by the Legislative Reference Bureau.295 A staff
attorney and policy specialist with the Youth Policy and Law Center, Inc.
sent a memo with draft language to the Legislative Reference Bureau
accompanied with a letter asking the bill drafter to consider the dissent
by a Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice in an earlier case on a related
issue. 296 This draft version was sent to a state representative, and was
found by the dissent to be "remarkably similar" to the present statute.297 The dissent cited several memos from the private lobbyist for
the proposition that the statute contained a narrow definition of
abandonment. 298 The dissent also cited another version of legislation
on this topic which contained a broader definition of abandonment, but
291. Id. at 43. The court cited Webster's Third New International Dictionary which
listed the following definitions of "leave": lb (3): to cause to be or remain in some specified
condition;... 2a (1): to permit to remain undisturbed or in the same position. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1287 (1976). The first definition did not apply to
Franklin's actions, but the second definition did apply.
292. Id. at 43-45.
293. Id. at 47-48 (Dykman, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 48-50 (Dykman, J., dissenting).
295. Id. (Dykman, J., dissenting).
296. Rhonda R.D., 530 N.W.2d at 48-49 (Dykman, J., dissenting).
297. Id.
298. Id.
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the dissent pointed out that particular version never passed-supporting
the assertion that the legislature therefore intended the narrow
definition.299
While such a research job is impressive, the conclusion of such an
effort was tenuous and ultimately unpersuasive to the majority in
Rhonda R.D.. Citing private sources for the meaning of legislation is
disfavored."° Lobbyists have their own agendas, whether they are
lobbying for businesses or for children's rights. It is impossible to know
if the elected officials of the Wisconsin state legislature understood and
voted for the meaning encapsulated in a memo written by a private
lobbyist.
When a Wisconsin court finds an ambiguous statute, it may use a
dictionary before, or in conjunction with, legislative history. The Court
of Appeals, in In Re Appointment of Counsel, found ambiguity in
Wisconsin Statute section 227.40(2)(b), governing under what circumstances a court is authorized to determine the validity of an administrative rule."' The court first used BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 2 and
then it used legislative history to find that the State Public Defender's
determination that the individual was not indigent (thereby failing to
qualify for representation at public expense) was not a "criminal
prosecution, and, therefore, could not be reviewed by a court.""3 3
Because it is harder to formulate a contrived interpretation of a
statute by using canons and plain language to fool people than it is
through the use of legislative history, restricting the use of legislative
history helps reduce such abuse. This is just as true in state courts as it
is in federal courts. One example of how it is easier to spot "stretching"
of a statute through plain language can be seen in Barnes v. Department
of Natural Resources."° The court in Barnes denied a petition filed by
Barnes to review the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) decision

299. Id.at 49-50 (Dykman, J., dissenting).
300. Id.
301. In re Appointment of Counsel, 542 N.W.2d 458, 461 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
302. It is interesting to note how dictionaries are sometimes used by Wisconsin courts.
Wisconsin courts "must construe all statutory words that are not technical according to
common and approved usage." State v. Timmerman, 542 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995). This often means using Black's Law Dictionary. See State v. Demars, 349 N.W.2d 708,
710 n.7 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). However, sometimes the definition found in Black's originates
in old case law, and Wisconsin Courts have chosen to cite contemporary dictionaries such as
Webster's or American Heritage. See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Madison Metro. School Dist.,
541 N.W.2d 786, 794 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
303. In re Appointment of Counsel, 542 N.W.2d at 461.
304. 506 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
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not to add the bobcat to the State's list of endangered species. The
statute in question defined "endangered species" as one whose "continued existence as a viable component of this state's wild animals ... is

determined by the department to be in jeopardy on the basis of scientific
evidence.""3 5
Barnes contended that the DNR erred by not taking into account the
French history of the word "jeopardy" when applying these definitions
to determine the bobcat's status." 6 "Barnes asserted that 'jeopardy' is
derived from the French word 'jeu parti,' meaning 'a divided game, a
game in which the chances are even,' and consequently if it is an 'even
call whether the bobcat is at risk or danger, it is in jeopardy."' 3 The
court rejected this stretched interpretation of plain meaning, citing
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY for the

definition

of "jeopardy":
the "'exposure to or imminence of death, loss or
30 8
injury."
While Wisconsin courts have not joined Justice Scalia's repudiation
of legislative history, his criticism of this tool for interpretation has not
gone unnoticed by the state's courts. One example where a Wisconsin
court acknowledged Justice Scalia's rejection of legislative history was in
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire."°9 The court in Hallie had to
decide whether Wisconsin Statute section 66.021(15) prohibiting the
creation of "town islands" by another city's annexation of land envisioned neutral impassable territory, such as a no access highway or a
lake, as contributing to the enclosure of that town island. The court had
made a similar decision in a prior case, finding that such impassable
territory helped constitute a town island. 10
The Hallie court determined that the relevant statute was ambiguous
and looked to legislative history. Before referencing legislative history,
however, the court noted Justice Scalia's warnings about such a practice.
"[T]he numerous arguments made by the parties to this litigation
evidence the tenuous nature of legislative history analysis. Justice Scalia
305. Barnes, 506 N.W.2d at 163 (citing Wis. STAT. § 29.415(2)(a) (1991-92)).
306. The bobcat population was essentially stable, but it recently experienced a minor
decline.
307. Barnes, 506 N.W.2d at 163 n.6.
308. Id. at 163.
309. 501 N.W.2d 49 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), overruled by Wagner Mobile, Inc. v. City of
Madison, 527 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 1995).
310. Town of Sheboygan v. City of Sheboygan, 483 N.W.2d 306 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992),
overruled by Wagner Mobil, Inc. v. City of Madison, 527 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 1995). In
Sheboygan, the town island was cut off from the rest of the town in party by Lake Michigan.
Id.
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has repeatedly warned of over-reliance on legislative history." '' The
court then cited Justice Scalia's concurrence in Conroy v. AniskoffF'
33
noting the illegitimacy and indeterminacy of legislative history.
The court also mentioned Judge Harold Levanthal's quote (also used
by Justice Scalia) comparing the use of legislative history to looking for
one's friends in a crowded cocktail party. 14 While citing these warnings, the Court of Appeals chose to ignore them and decided their case
based on legislative history and prior precedent:
However, to extend Judge Levanthal's metaphor, having given
the room the once-over and "found our friends," it would be
erroneous, not to mention fickle, to again peruse the crowd and
re-choose. Therefore, we stand by our interpretation of sec.
precedent
66.021(15)
315 in Sheboyqan and follow it as the binding
that it is.
Just two years later the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly overruled
Sheboyqan and Hallie by finding that Wisconsin Statute section
66.021(15) was not ambiguous (that the town island must be completely
surrounded by only the annexing city) in Wagner Mobile, Inc. v. City of
Madison.316
Another reference by Wisconsin courts to Justice Scalia and a general
warning about the use of legislative history was in Mortier v. Town of
Casey.317 The issue in Mortier was whether a town was preempted
from regulating the use of pesticides by the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).1 8 The court could not find
any express preemption language in FIFRA and decided the language
was ambiguous." The court then extensively reviewed the legislative
history (predominantly committee reports) of FIFRA to determine that
cities and towns were preempted from regulating pesticides."2
In her dissent, Justice Abrahamson claimed FIFRA was simply silent
on the question of preemption and she sharply criticized the majority for

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Hallie, 501 N.W.2d at 51.
Conroy, 507 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J. concurring).
Hallie, 501 N.W.2d at 51.
Id. (quoting 507 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
Id
Wagner Mobile, Inc., 527 N.W.2d at 301.
452 N.W. 2d 555 (Wis. 1990), rev'd by Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501

U.S. 597 (1991).

318. 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1982).
319. Mortier, 452 N.W.2d at 557-58.
320. Id
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resting its decision entirely on legislative history.32' Justice Abrahamson found that the legislative history itself was ambiguous: "Courts must
use federal legislative history with healthy skepticism, recognizing that
the history may not always be a trustworthy indication of congressional
intent."3" Justice Abraamson then cited Justice Scalia's criticism in
Thompson v. Thompson of committee reports and floor speeches as
sources for law.3" After citing other sources of criticism of legislative
history, Justice Abrahamson proceeded to critique the majority's use of
legislative history to demonstrate that it was indeed indeterminate at
best.
The United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court, stating that neither the
plain language of the statute nor the legislative history demonstrated the
congressional intent to preempt local regulation of pesticides.324 The
eight justice majority took a soft line on the use of legislative history,
maintaining that while it did not demonstrate intent in this situation,
legislative materials can be useful if employed in a good-faith effort to
discern legislative intent.3 s Justice Scalia wrote a lone concurrence,
primarily choosing to criticize the use of committee reports because of
their unreliability.3r 6 His concurrence vindicated the mistrust of
legislative history expressed by Justice Abrahamson in her dissent in the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.
While the use of legislative history is still commonly accepted in
Wisconsin, state judges are increasingly resisting the temptation to make
long and winding ventures into legislative history, or they are at least
more wary of the pitfalls of such ventures.
As textualists such as Justice Scalia continue to write more opinions,
this wariness of legislative history will certainly continue at the state
court level. While legislative history will always be "fair game" for
judges, it will most likely be used in a less frequent and more focused
manner, i.e., providing the basis for interpretation only when the intent

321. Id. at 562-63 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 564 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
323. Id at 564 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson, 484 U.S. at 191-92).
324. 501 U.S. 597, 615-16 (1991).
325. Id. at 609-10 n.4. In footnote 4, the majority specifically criticized Justice Scalia's
concurrence and expressly endorsed the use of legislative history. Id.
326. Id. at 617 (Scalia, J. concurring). See Justice Scalia's criticism of committee reports
discussed supra Part II.B. 39-42. Justice Scalia agreed with the reading of the legislative
history by the Wisconsin Supreme Court majority opinion-faulting them only for failing to
recognize how unreliable the reports are.
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of the state legislature reflected in the legislative history is clear to
everyone.
VII.

OTHER STATE COURTS

While it has only been a few years since Justice Scalia has been
leading the fight against the use of legislative history on the Supreme
Court, very few states have specifically picked up this movement and
followed his views. Courts will find statutes to be unambiguous and,
therefore, not require the review of legislative history, but few have
expressly criticized the use of legislative history. Few judges have taken
stands against the use of legislative history and refused to join a majority
opinion, and instead, like Justice Scalia, chosen to write a concurring
opinion devoid of legislative history. There are some exceptions.
One good example of a court criticizing the use of legislative history
is Omaha Public Power District v. Nebraska Department of Revenue
decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska. The case centered on
whether the generation of electricity by the Omaha Public Power District
(OPPD) and Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) constituted the
"manufacture" of "tangible personal property" within the meaning of the
Employment Expansion and Investment Incentive Act ("the Act") in
Nebraska, thereby qualifying them for tax credits worth approximately
$4.8 million.3" Of the six judge panel, three judges comprised the
majority which reversed the lower court's decision and denied the tax
also denied the
credit and three judges comprised the concurrence which
329
history.
legislative
using
without
so
did
tax credit, but
The majority in Omaha Public Power used WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY of the English language to state that
electricity is not "tangible" as it is energy and not matter with a mass
which is "capable of being touched. '33 1 The majority noted that a
scientific discussion of the properties of electricity was legally inconclusive, and instead proceeded to review the legislative history of the
Act. 331 The history which the majority referred to appeared to state
that the purpose of the Act was to provide tax credits to manufacturing
businesses only because they create more jobs than service business-

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

537 N.W.2d 312 (Neb. 1995).
Id at 315.
Id.at 314, 320.
L at 317.
Omaha Public Power,537 N.W.2d at 317.
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es.332 The majority also considered the fact that the legislature had
traditionally treated public utilities differently than retailers of tangible
personal property within the context of sales and use tax laws.333 The
majority concluded that the public utilities were "service" businesses and
did not qualify for tax credits under the Act.3
The concurrence reached the same result but took a very different
route. Justice Caporale, writing the concurrence, used the dictionary to
determine that "tangible property" is not ambiguous and does not
include electricity: "While under certain circumstances one can feel the
presence of electricity, and it can be stored and measured, it has no
readily discernible physical form in the sense that do items such as axes,
'
books, cloth, desks, elevators, fiddles, gavels, and the like."335
The
concurrence quoted Justice Scalia for the proposition that the court
should not "scavenge" the world of English usage to find possible
meanings for words, but rather to "'determine whether the ordinary
meaning includes [it], and if it does not, to ask whether there is any solid
indication in the text or structure of the statute that something other
than ordinary meaning was intended."'336
Interestingly, most of the concurrence is spent criticizing the majority
for consulting the legislative history of the Act. The concurrence
criticized the majority's use of committee hearing reports and a comment
made during the floor debate of the statute.337 Judge Caporale quoted
Justice Scalia regarding committee reports:
Assuming that all the members of the... committees in question ... actually adverted to the interpretive point at issue
here-which is probably an unrealistic assumption-and assuming
further that they were in unanimous agreement on the point, they
would still represent [a vast minority]. It is most unlikely that
many [legislators] read the pertinent portions of the Committee
Reports before voting on the bill-assuming (we cannot be sure)
that the Reports were available before the vote.338
Judge Caporale also criticized floor debates for being inconclusive in
terms of finding statutory meaning. Far less reliable, as sources of

332. Id. at 317-18.
333. Id. at 318-19.
334. Id at 320 (Caporale, J., concurring).

335. Id. at 320 (Caporale, J., concurring).
336. Ic (quoting Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
337. Omaha Public Power, 537 N.W.2d at 321.

338. Id at 321 (quoting Wisconsin Public Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 620 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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statutory meaning
are remarks made during floor debate-even "authoritative"
explanations offered by a bill's sponsors. While a sponsor's
statements may reveal his understanding and intentions, they
hardly provide definitive insights into [the legislative body's]
understanding of the meaning of a particular provision. Few of
his fellow legislators will have been on hand to hear the gloss the
sponsor may have placed on a particular provision. Thus
members of [the body], in voting on a measure, must be presumed to have relied on the meaning of the words read in context
on a printed page. Moreover, a statute's sponsor may well be
pursuing a political agenda in his floor discussion that judges are
ill-equipped to detect.339
Additionally, Judge Caporale discussed the incentives for legislators
to distort the legislative record. Any such "suspect" history could
provide a "scalpel to excise a provision this court deems unwise, unjust,
or simply undesirable, or to change what, in this court's opinion, ought
to have been done some other way."'" Likewise, a fractional group
might be able to submit a number of statements which taken together
would be misleading or at least provide enough doubt in the mind of a
judge for them to declare legislative history to be indeterminate, when
it might otherwise provide an answer.34 ' The Supreme Court of
Nebraska is not alone in criticizing the use of legislative history. While
clearly more courts use legislative history, and use it without much
hesitation, an increasing number are recognizing that it is a unique tool
for interpretation which requires caution. Such courts include the
Supreme Courts of California and Arizona. Some judges have used
legislative history only cautiously after acknowledging its shortcomings
and some judges have rejected the use of legislative history altogether.34 In a few of these cases judges have gone a little too far to
339. Id. (quoting Overseas Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. FLRA, 876 F.2d 960,975 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Buckley, J., concurring)).
340. IM.at 322 (quoting Wang v. Board of Education, 260 N.W.2d 475, 580 (1977)
(Clinton, J., dissenting)).
341. Id. at 322-23 (Caporale, J., concurring).
342. See People v. Bransford, 884 P.2d 70, 75, 80 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("[T]he majority has gone beyond the stringent prohibitions
enacted by the Legislature and has on its own created the new crime of driving with alcohol
on one's breath .... The temptation to stretch the law to fit the evil is an ancient one, and
it must be resisted... our task is to apply the laws that the Legislature has enacted, not those
it could have enacted but did not."'); Hamblen Co. Education Ass'n v. Hamblen Co. Board
of Education, 892 S.W.2d 428, 434 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) ("The Board urges us to examine
[W]e
the legislative history of the EPNA [Educational Professional Negotiations Act] ....
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enforce the "plain meaning" of the statute,343 but the rejection of
legislative history has generally been successful.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

As legislatures pass more statutes which are increasingly complicated
and overlap more with one another, courts will be faced with more
problems of statutory interpretation. Methods for interpreting statutes
must be carefully scrutinized so that courts interpret laws properly.
While legislative history is just one of many tools for interpretation, it is
resist the temptation to visit the morass which is the 113 pages of transcript of legislative
debate on the initial enactment of the EPNA, filled as it is with what are arguably partisan
statements on both sides of the debate."); Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668, 673
(Ariz. 1994) (en banc) ("Divining Congress' intent by examining legislative history has been
derided by Justice Scalia as 'the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking
over the heads of the guests for one's friends' .....
Nevertheless, when a statute's meaning
is disputed, we believe it is important, though not always dispositive, to review the statute's
legislative history to find, if possible, any shared legislative understanding of the relevant
language .... In this case, however, the history of (the statute in question) discloses few
recognizable faces, friendly or otherwise, in the legislative crowd."); Marposs Corp. v. City of
Troy, 514 N.W.2d 202, 207, n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (Taylor, J., dissenting) ("Legislative
histories are always suspicious."); People v. Vauqhan, 19 Cal. Rpt. 2d 577,583 (Cal. Ct. App.
4 1995) ("If the cited legislative history were more informative it would still be a weak basis
for construction; the absence of information here renders it largely useless."); Mozo v. State
of Florida, 632 So. 2d 623, 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Farmer, J., concurring) ("I am
generally not willing to construe statutes by the currently popular device of consulting what
I regard as the tea leaves of legislative history . . . . For my taste, we might just as
meaningfully send to know what the oracle at Delphi said. I confess to standing with Justice
Scalia about this use of legislative histories."); Morris v. Franchise Tax Board, 22 Cal. Rpt. 2d
577, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("Great mischief can be wrought by reference to legislative
history as an expression of legislative intent.").
See also J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Superior Court of Orange Co., 33 Cal. Rptr.2d 206 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994). The court in J.A. Jones stated, "There are those who would say that even in
looking at legislative history we were on shaky ground ....[W]e must acknowledge that the
criticisms of judicial use of legislative history are formidable indeed. Legislative history has
become contaminated by documents which are more aimed at influencing the judiciary after
the bill is passed than explaining to the rest of the legislature what the bill is about before it
is passed." Id. at 211. In support of its position, the court presented lengthy citations for
criticism of legislative history from William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA
L.REv. 621 (1990), but ultimately concluded, "[f]ormidable as these criticisms are, they do not
warrant a blanket rule against all use of legislative history."). Id.
343. See, e.g., Unzuata v. Ocean View School Dist., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992). In the Unzuata case, the court followed a very strict reading of the plain text and
compelled a school district to provide two years of back pay for a teacher who had been
suspended following an arrest on a drug charge which had been subsequently diverted after
successful counseling. Id. at 616. The teacher could have been fired, but the school district
gave him a second chance. Id. Upon being reinstated, the teacher sued the school district for
backpay, even though he had been working and earning money at another job during the
suspension. Id.
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commonly used by most judges in both federal and state courts.
Until Justice Scalia was appointed to the Supreme Court, criticism of
the use of legislative history existed, but it lacked significant influence
over courts across the country. In less than a decade, Justice Scalia's
decisions have managed to rekindle the debate over the use of legislative
history. The Supreme Court is where the most influential debate over
the rise of textualism relative to the use of legislative history will take
place. Justice Scalia will lead those opposed to the use of legislative
history. Many expect Justice Breyer to be the leading defender of the
use of legislative history. That is why it is so important to dissect what
Justices Scalia and Breyer say about legislative history.
Justice Breyer advocates cautious use of legislative history. While his
arguments are well reasoned, many in the legal community are not as
cautious with their use of legislative history. Some go as far as to abuse
legislative history to forward their political or social agendas.
Justice Scalia definitely raises valid concerns about the use of
legislative history. Many types of legislative history are too far removed
from the legislative process to have legitimacy. In many cases legislative
history is indeterminate. Legislative history is also susceptible to
manipulation. Advocates of the use of legislative history can downplay
these problems, but they clearly exist.
It is certainly true that other tools for interpretation can be abused.
One could selectively use canons to arrive at a result which they favored.
However, in most cases, manipulation of canons and plain meaning is
easier to detect than manipulation of legislative history. Legislative
history usually consists of several slivers of statements plucked from
reams of floor statements or early drafts of legislation. What is relevant?
How far back does one look? Which sources can be trusted? While one
can make reasonable judgments on such questions, the entire inquiry
contains a multitude of problems.
Justice Scalia has laid out general guidelines for the proper inquiry
into legislative history. These guidelines have been more fully developed
by those like Judge Easterbrook on the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. Courts should use legislative history to find what the words in
the statute mean, not to discover what the legislature intended the
statute to do. Statutes are law, not evidence of law.3" This view of
statutory interpretation is much like a judge interpreting a contract. Just
as the parole evidence rule prevents evidence of outside agreements

344. In re Sinclair,870 F.2d at 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989).
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which contradict the written contract, so to should legislative history be
excluded from review when it contradicts the plain meaning of the
statute.
Implementing the appropriate approach to interpret statutes and
achieving the proper result is much easier said than done. Justice
Frankfurter recognized this fact:
Whether a judge does violence to language in its total context is
not always free from doubt. Statutes come out of the past and
aim at the future. They may carry implicit residues or mere hints
of purpose .... But a line does exist between omission and what
Holmes called "misprision or abbreviation that does not conceal
the purpose." Judges may differ as to the point at which the line
should be drawn, but the only sure safeguard against crossing the
line between adjudication and legislation is an alert recognition
of the necessity345 not to cross
it and instinctive, as well as
346
trained, reluctance to do so.
However, that difficulty does not release judges from their duty to
adhere to the meaning of the language in the statute.
The decisions and trends formed in the Supreme Court will work
their way down to state courts across the country. While state courts
hear many of our nation's cases, little has been written on the use of
legislative history in state courts. Obviously, it is critical to know the
tendencies of state court judges because there is such a wide discrepancy
in mode of analysis between the textualists and those who reference
legislative history.
Wisconsin state courts, which seem to be typical in their consideration
of legislative history, do not follow a clear Scalia-like textualist analysis.
While a number of Wisconsin judges hesitate to look at legislative
history, there is no outright rejection of legislative history as in some
courts like the Supreme Court of Nebraska. While Wisconsin courts rely
too heavily on legislative history (which has produced some unfortunate
or questionable decisions), there is not too much abuse of legislative
history in Wisconsin. There are a couple of reasons why problems with
legislative history may not be as great in state courts. First, there is
simply not as much legislative history to rely upon for state laws. While
states hold hearings and have debates, the process is not nearly as
extensive as for most federal laws. State courts have less to go through,

345. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM L. REV.
527, 535 (1947).
346. Id.
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and therefore have less of an opportunity to find faulty legislative
history. Second, state courts tend to deal with less politically charged
issues than federal courts. While there are plenty of heated controversies at the state level (e.g., cases involving parental rights, or insurance
claims), state cases deal more with "lawyers' laws" and things which do
not generate the same public attention. However, these issues are still
important, and legislative history must still be used appropriately-if at
all.
The best course would be to strike a compromise between Justices
Scalia and Breyer. There are very few cases where legislative history can
produce a clear answer that could not be found by using a different
method. However, there are still those few cases where legislative
history (when carefully used) provides the best means of understanding
a statute. Both state and federal courts would do well to not only reduce
the use of legislative history, but also be much more selective and careful
with its use.
The current composition of the Supreme Court might be the ideal
way to strike this compromise between textualists and those who refer
to legislative history. Having two or three textualists on the Court has
forced the other justices to be much more careful with their use of
legislative history by either using more definite examples or abandoning
its use altogether to assemble a five-vote majority. If an opinion
contains the use of legislative history which is too tenuous, justices will
write their own concurrences, and the statement by the Court will be
weakened. While Wisconsin does not have such a composition on its
Supreme Court, the same dynamics could happen. Such a composition
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court would reduce the misuse of legislative
history and improve the quality of statutory interpretation.

